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Abstrat
We develop a new framework for modeling innovation networks whih evolve over time.
The nodes in the network represent rms, whereas the direted links represent unilateral
interations between the rms. Both nodes and links evolve aording to their own dynamis
and on dierent time sales. The model assumes that rms produe knowledge based on the
knowledge exhange with other rms, whih involves both osts and benets for the partii-
pating rms. In order to inrease their knowledge prodution, rms follow dierent strategies
to reate and/or to delete links with other rms. Dependent on the information rms take
into aount for their deision, we nd the emergene of dierent network strutures. We
analyze the onditions for the existene of these strutures within a mathematial approah
and underpin our ndings by extensive omputer simulations whih show the evolution of
the networks and their equilibrium state. In the disussion of the results, partiular attention
is given to the emergene of diret and indiret reiproity in knowledge exhange, whih
refers to the emergene of yles in the network struture.
In order to motivate our modeling framework, in the rst part of the hapter we
give a broad overview of existing literature from eonomis and physis. This shows that
our framework bridges and extends two dierent lines of researh, namely the study of
equilibrium networks with simple topologies and the dynami approah of hyperyle models.
Keywords: Catalyti Networks, Innovation Networks, R&D Collaborations, Network
Formation
1 Introdution
1.1 The Importane of Innovation Networks
Eonomists widely agree on tehnologial hange and innovation being the main omponents
of eonomi growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Tirole, 1988). In the absene of ongoing teh-
nologial improvements eonomi growth an hardly be maintained (Barro and Sala-i Martin,
2004). The lose link between innovation and eonomi performane has beome generally a-
epted. Following this insight, in reent years of eonomi growth, OECD ountries have fostered
investments in siene, tehnology and innovation (OECD, 2006).
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Moreover, tehnologies are beoming inreasingly omplex. This inreasing omplexity of teh-
nologies an make an agent's in-house innovative eort insuient to ompete in an R&D
intensive eonomy. Thus, agents have to beome more speialized on spei domains of a teh-
nology and they tend to rely on knowledge transfers from other agents, whih are speialized
in dierent domains, in order to ombine omplementary domains of knowledge for prodution
(reombinant growth (Weitzman, 1998)).
When one agent benets from knowledge reated elsewhere we speak of knowledge spillovers.
Knowledge spillovers dene any original, valuable knowledge generated somewhere that beomes
aessible to external agents ... other than the originator.
1
(Foray, 2004, p. 95)
The knowledge-based eonomy is developing towards a state in whih the osts for aquiring,
reproduing and transmitting knowledge are onstantly dereasing, spatial and geographial
limitations on knowledge exhange are beoming less important and attitudes hange towards
more open behavior of sharing knowledge instead of hiding it from others. In this state, knowledge
externalities will play an inreasingly important role.
When agents are using knowledge that is reated elsewhere, they must have aess to other
agents aross a network whose links represent the exhange or transfer of knowledge between
agents. The importane of networks in innovative eonomies has been widely reognized, e.g. it
has been observed that the development of knowledge within industries is strongly inuened by
the network struture of relations among agents (Antonelli, 1996, p. 1). Subsequently, an ample
body of empirial researh has doumented the steady growth of R&D partnerships among rms
(Hagedoorn et al., 2006).
1.1.1 Markets for Knowledge Exhange
The exhange of knowledge is not unproblemati. Markets for knowledge exhange an exhibit
serious market failures (Gerosky, 1995; Arora et al., 2004) whih make it diult for innovators
to realize a reasonable return from trading the results of their R&D ativities (the problem of
appropriability (Gerosky, 1995)). This is due to the publi good harater of knowledge, whih
makes it dierent from produts or servies. Knowledge is non-rival, meaning its use by one
agent does not diminish its usability by another agent, and sometimes (when knowledge spillovers
annot be avoided) non-exludable, meaning that the reator of new knowledge annot prevent
non-payers from using it. The problems assoiated with trading of knowledge an prevent agents
from exhanging knowledge at all.
There are three generi reasons for failures of markets for tehnology (Arrow, 1962; Gerosky,
1995; Arora et al., 2004): (1) eonomies of sale/sope, (2) unertainty and (3) externalities.
1
Involuntary spillovers are a feature of market ompetition. Competition not only reates inentives to produe
new knowledge but it also fores the other agents to inrease their own performane through imitation, adoption
and absorption of the new knowledge reated elsewhere. (Foray, 2004, p. 91)
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(1) R&D projets often require huge initial investments and they an exhibit eonomies of sale
sine the ost for useful tehnologial information per unit of output delines as the level of
output inreases (Wilson, 1975). Besides, Nelson (1959) has shown that eonomies of sope an
apply to innovative agents. The broader an agents' tehnologial base, the more likely it is that
any outome of its R&D ativities will be useful for her. The result is that markets for knowledge
exhange are often dominated by monopolies.
(2) Almost all eonomi investments bear a risk of how the market will respond to the new
produt (ommerial suess). Innovators fae additional risks. First, their investment into R&D
does not neessarily lead to a new tehnology. Seond, if suh a new tehnology is disovered,
it has to be put into pratie in a new and better produt than the already existing ones. This
inherent unertainty of R&D projets often auses agents to invest too little.
(3) Externalities are important when the ation of one agent inuenes the prots of another
agent without ompensation through the market. Publi goods are a typial example of reating
externalities. Knowledge is a publi good and the returns innovators an realize often are far
below their investments into R&D. This an seriously diminish an agent's inentive to do R&D.
In order to overome the above mentioned problems assoiated with the returns on investment
into R&D appropriate inentive mehanisms have to be reated that enourage agents to invest
into R&D. In general, Von Hippel and Von Krogh (2003) suggest three basi models of enour-
aging agents to invest into R&D:
(1), the private investment model assumes that innovation is undertaken by private agents in-
vesting their resoures to reate an innovation. Soiety then provides agents with limited rights
to exlusively use the results of their innovation through patents or other intelletual property
rights (by reating a temporarly monopoly)
2
.
(2), the so alled olletive ation model (Allen, 1983) assumes that agents are reating knowl-
edge as a publi good. Knowledge is made publi and unonditionally supplied to a publi pool
aessible to everybody. The problem is that potential beneiaries ould wait until others pro-
vide the publi good and thereby ould free-ride. One solution to this problem is to provide
ontributors (in this ase innovators) with some form of subsidy. Sienti researh is suh an
example where reputation based rewards are granted to sientists for their good performane.
(3), in the private-olletive innovation model partiipants use their private resoures in reating
new knowledge and then make it publily available. This is typially observed in open soure
projets. There are several inentives (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Von Hippel and Von Krogh,
2003) for agents to partiipants in open-soure projets. These range from elevated reputa-
tions, the desire of building a ommunity to the expetation of reiproity from the ommunity
members for their eorts.
The olletive ation approah (2) gives a possible explanation for the willingness of agents to
share knowledge if there are no osts assoiated with it. One an think of a pool of tehnologies
2
For a more detailed treatment of this issue we reommend Sothmer (2004).
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that is aessible to everybody (broadasting of tehnologies) (Allen, 1983). This an be the ase
where agents are non-rivals and shared information may have no ompetitive ost. Additionally,
knowledge must be easily understandable and transferable. This assumes that knowledge is highly
odied
3
suh that the transfer of knowledge from one agent to the other is ostless. But, if
these assumptions do not hold, the osts for transferring knowledge an often be onsiderable,
and agents beome more seletive about whom to share their knowledge with. We study this
situation in the next setions.
1.2 Eonomies as Evolving Networks
As we already outlined above, modern eonomies are beoming inreasingly networked, and this
also aets the innovation proess where information and knowledge are exhanged by intera-
tions between agents (Kirman, 1997; Gallegati and Kirman, 1999). In the agent based view, the
aggregate behavior of the eonomy (maroeonomis) annot be investigated in terms of the be-
havior of isolated individuals. Not only there are dierent ways in whih rms interat, learning
over time, based on their previous experiene; also interations between them take plae within
a network and not in a all-to-all fashion.
The standard neolassial model
4
of the eonomy assumes that anonymous and autonomous
individuals take deisions independently and interat only through the prie system whih they
annot inuene at all. However, ompetition easily beomes imperfet beause, if agents have
only a minimal market power, they will antiipate the onsequenes of their ations and antiipate
the ations of others.
Game theorists have tried to integrate the idea of strategially interating agents into a neo-
lassial
5
framework. But still they leave two questions unanswered. First, it is assumed that
the behavior is fully optimizing. This leads to agents with extremely sophistiated information
proessing apabilities. Suh ability of passing these enormous amounts of information in short
times annot be found in any realisti setting of human interation. Advanes in weakening that
assumption are referred to as boundedly rationality (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002). Seond, the
3
The opposite ase of odied knowledge is tait knowledge. Tait knowledge is diult to make expliit for
transfer and reprodution. The exhange, diusion, and learning of tait knowledge require those who have it to
take deliberate ation to share it. This is diult and ostly to implement ... Knowledge an, however, be odied.
It an be expressed in a partiular language and reorded on a partiular medium. As suh, it is detahed from
the individual. When knowledge is odied, it beomes easily transferable. (Foray, 2004, p. 73)
4
A standard neolassial model inludes the following assumptions (Gabszewiz, 2000): (1) perfet ompetition,
(2) perfet information, (3) rational behavior, (4) all pries are exible (all markets are in equilibrium). The
resulting market equilibrium (alloation of goods) is then eient. See Hausman (2003) for a disussion of these
assumptions.
5
The individual deision making proess is represented as maximizing a utility funtion. A utility funtion
is a way of assigning a number to every possible hoie suh that more-preferred hoies have a higher number
than less-preferred ones (Varian, 1996). The gradients of the utility funtion are imagined to be like fores driving
people to trade, and from whih eonomi equilibria emerge as a kind of fore balane (Farmer et al., 2005).
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problem of oordination of ativities is not addressed in the standard equilibrium model of the
eonomy. Instead it is assumed that every agent an interat and trade with every other agent,
whih beomes quite unrealisti for large systems.
One has to speify the framework within the individual agents take prie deisions and thus limit
the environment within whih they operate and reason. An obvious way is to view the eonomy
as a network in whih agents interat only with their neighbors. In the ase of tehnologial
innovation, neighbors might be similar rms within the same industry, but these rms will then
be linked either through ustomers or suppliers with rms in other industries. Through these
onnetions innovations will diuse through the network. The rate and extent of this diusion
then depends on the struture and onnetivity of the network. The evolution of the network
itself should be made endogenous where the evolution of the link struture is dependent on the
agents' experiene from using the links available to them. In this framework the individuals learn
and adapt their behavior and this in turns leads to an evolution of the network struture. The
eonomy then beomes a omplex evolving network.
1.2.1 Complex Networks
Although no preise mathematial denition exists for a omplex network, it is worth to elaborate
the notion assoiated with it. In general, a network is a set of items some of whih are linked
together by pairwise relationships. The struture of the relationships an be represented math-
ematially as a graph in whih nodes are onneted by links (possibly with varying strength).
However a network is usually also assoiated with some dynami proess on the nodes whih in
turn aets the struture of the relationships to other nodes. A wide variety of systems an be
desribed as a network, ranging from ells (a set of hemials onneted by hemial reations),
to the Internet (a set of routers linked by physial information hannels). It is lear that the
struture of the relationships o-evolves with the funtion of the items involved.
As a rst step, a network an be desribed simply in terms of its assoiated graph
6
. There are
two extreme ases of relatively simple graphs: regular latties on one side and random graphs
7
on the other side. During the last entury, graph theory and statistial physis have developed a
body of theories and tools to desribe the behavior of systems represented by latties and random
graphs. However, it turns out that, at least for physial sales larger than biomoleules, most
systems are not strutured as latties or as random graphs. Moreover, suh a struture is not the
result of a design, but it emerges from self-organization. In some ases self-organization results
6
In general a graph represents pairwise relations between objets from a ertain olletion. A graph then
onsists of a olletion of nodes and a olletion of links that onnet pairs of nodes.
7
The lassial Erdös-Reny random graph is dened by the following rules (Bollobas, 1985):
(1) The total number of nodes is xed.
(2) Randomly hosen pairs of nodes are onneted by links with probability p.
The onstrution proedure of suh a graph may be thought of as the subsequent addition of new links between
nodes hosen at random, while the total number of nodes is xed.
5/84
Mihael D. König, Stefano Battiston, Frank Shweitzer: Modeling Evolving Innovation Networks
In: Innovation Networks - New Approahes in Modeling and Analyzing (Eds. A. Pyka, A. Sharnhorst)
Heidelberg: Springer, 2008
from the attempt to optimize a global funtion. In other ases, as it is typial in eonomis, it
results from nodes loally trying to optimize their goals, e.g. an individual utility funtion.
Large networks are olletively designated as omplex networks if their struture (1) is oupled
to the funtionality, (2) emerges from self-organization, and (3) deviates from trivial graphs,
This denition inludes many large systems of enormous tehnologial, intelletual, soial and
eonomial impat (Frenken, 2006).
1.3 The Statistial Physis Approah
As we will disuss later, many of the theoretial tools developed in eonomis and speially
in game theory to haraterize the stability of small networks of rms annot be used for large
networks. Asking whih is the optimal set of onnetions that a rm should establish with other
rms has little meaning in a large network if strategi interation is taken into aount (with
more than say, 100 nodes it is simply not feasible to ompute). On the other hand, it makes
sense to ask what are onnetivity properties of the nodes a rm should try to target in order
to improve its utility with a ertain probability. It is then neessary to turn towards a statistial
desription of these systems, where one is no longer interested in individual quantities but only
in averaged quantities.
There exists an arsenal of suh tools developed within statistial physis in the last entury, that
allow to predit the marosopi behavior of a system from the loal properties of its onstituents
(Durlauf, 1999; Stanley et al., 1999). Suh tools work very well for systems of idential partiles
embedded in regular or random network strutures in whih interations depend on physial
distane. Both a regular and a random struture have a lot of symmetries, whih one an exploit
to simplify the desription of the system. However, in omplex networks many of those symmetries
are broken: individuals and interations are heterogeneous. Moreover the physial distane is often
irrelevant (think for instane of knowledge exhange via the Internet). Therefore, a satisfatory
desription of suh systems represents a major hallenge for statistial physis (Amaral et al.,
2001).
In the last few years we have thus witnessed an inreasing interest and eort within the eld of
statistial physis in studying omplex networks that traditionally were objet of investigation
by other disiplines, ranging from biology to omputer siene, linguistis, politis, anthropology
and many others. One of the major ontributions of statistial physis to the eld of omplex
networks has been to demonstrate that several dynami proesses taking plae on networks that
deviate from random graphs, exhibit a behavior dramatially dierent from the ones observed
on random graphs.
An example for all is the ase of virus spreading: it has been shown that while for random
networks a loal infetion spreads to the whole network only if the spreading rate is larger than
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a ritial value, for sale-free networks
8
any spreading rate leads to the infetion of the whole
network. Now, tehnologial as well as soial networks are muh better desribed as sale free
graphs than as random graphs. Therefore all vaination strategies for both omputer and human
viruses, whih have been so far designed based on the assumption that suh networks were random
graphs, need to be revised. This highly unexpeted result goes against volumes previously written
on this topi and is due to the presene of a few nodes with very large onnetivity. In this ase,
the rare events (infetion of highly onneted nodes) and not the most frequent ones matter.
Explaining the marosopi behavior of a system in terms of the properties of the onstituents
has been a major suess of the physiist's redutionist approah. But, while in physial systems
the fores ating on single onstituents an be measured preisely, this is not the ase in a soio-
eonomi system where, moreover, eah agent is endowed with high internal omplexity. Today,
the physiist's approah to soio-eonomi systems diers from the nineteenth entury positivist
approah in so far as it does not aim at prediting, for instane the behavior of individual
agents. Instead, taking into aount the major driving fores in the interations among agents
at the loal level we try to infer, at a system level, some general trends or behavior that an be
onrmed looking at the data. This is also very dierent from taking aggregate quantities and
infer a marosopi behavior from a representative agent
9
as it is done in several approahes
in mainstream eonomis.
1.3.1 Dynamis versus Evolution in a Network
After disussing the notion of a omplex network whih has been strongly inuened by physis,
we now try to lassify dierent omplex networks.
The nodes in an eonomi network are assoiated with a state variable, representing the agents'
wealth, a rm's output or, in the ase of innovation networks, knowledge. There is an important
dierene between the evolution of the network and the dynamis taking plae on the state
variables. In the rst, nodes or links are added to/removed from the network by a spei
mehanism and in the latter, the state variables are hanged as a result of the interations
among onneted nodes (see also Gross and Blasius (2007) for a review). Consequently, there are
four aspets that an be investigated in omplex eonomi networks (Battiston, 2003).
1. statisti haraterization of the stati network topology without dynamis of state variables,
8
A sale-free network is haraterized by a degree distribution whih follows a power law, f(d) = αdγ . The
degree distribution gives the number of agents with a ertain number, d, of in- or outgoing links (in- or outdegree),
see the next setion for a denition of degree of a node.
9
The onept of the representative agent assumes an eonomy whih onsists of a suiently homogeneous
population of agents. Beause all the agents are equivalent, the aggregate quantities of the system an be alulated
by multiplying the average agent, or the representative agent, by the number of agents (the system size). For
example the total prodution of an eonomy is obtained by summing up the prodution levels of the individual
rms that onstitute the eonomy. To determine the behavior of the system it is therefore suient to know the
harateristis of the representative agent.
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2. Network evolution without dynamis of the state variables,
3. Dynamis of state variables in a stati network and
4. Dynamis of state variables and evolution of the network at the same time.
This an be inorporated in the following table.
ase state variables network
1. stati stati
2. dynami stati
3. stati dynami
4. dynami dynami
Table 1: Overview of the dierent ways in whih a network and the state variables of the nodes
an be related.
In soio-eonomi systems as well as in biologial systems, dynamis and evolution are often
oupled, but do not neessarily have the same time sale. In setion (4) we will show how
the oupling of fast knowledge growth (dynamis) and slow network evolution an lead to the
emergene of self-sustaining yles in a network of knowledge sharing (ooperating) agents.
1.4 Outline of this Chapter
In this hapter we fous on (i) the emergene and (ii) the performane of dierent strutures
in an evolving network. The dierent senarios we develop shall be applied to rms exhanging
knowledge in a ompetitive, R&D intensive eonomy. In the existing literature reviewed in the
following setion, there are two dierent lines of researh addressing these problems: (i) Models of
network formation were developed based on individual utility funtions, e.g. by Jakson (2003),
in whih simple arhitetures emerge in the equilibrium. (ii) In another group of models, e.g.
Padgett et al. (2003), rms have spei skills and take ations based on goals or learning and
innovation is assoiated with the emergene of self-sustaining yles of knowledge prodution.
Although both lines of work address the problem of network emergene and performane, they
dier signiantly in terms of methods and results. We try to bridge them by introduing a novel
model of evolving innovation networks that ombines the topologial evolution of the network
with dynamis assoiate with the network nodes
10
.
We start our approah by giving a short introdution to graph theory in setion (2.1). Here we
restrit ourselves only to the most important terms and denitions that are neessary in the
following setions
11
.
10
The approah of ombining a dynamis of the network with a dynamis in the nodes is disussed in
Gross and Blasius (2007).
11
The reader interested in more details in graph theory an onsult West (2001)
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We then proeed by giving an overview of the existing literature on eonomi networks. In the rst
part of our literature review we explore some basi models of innovation networks. The seletion
of these models is by no means unique nor exhaustive, but points to important ontributions
to the growing literature on eonomi and innovation networks
12
. Similar to our own approah,
these models make onsiderably simple assumptions and thus allow for analytial insights. This
holds in partiular for the onnetions model in setion (2.2). The model in setion (2.3) an be
onsidered as an extension of the basi onnetions model where small world networks emerge.
In the subsequent setion, (2.4), we disuss a model that takes heterogeneous knowledge into
aount, as a further extension. In the seond part of the literature review we briey sketh
models in whih we observe yli network topologies. We show that in ertain ases the stability
of a network and its performane depends ritially its yli struture. The ritial role of yles
in a networked eonomy has already been identied by Rosenblatt (1957) and many sueeding
authors, e.g. Maxeld (1994); Bala and Goyal (2000); Kim and Wong (2007). In this hapter
we review some reent models in whih yli networks emerge: in setion (2.5.1) a model of
prodution networks with losed loops is presented and in setion (2.5.2) we introdue a model
of yles of dierently skilled agents.
Finally, in setion (3) we develop a novel framework, whih we all Evolving Innovation Networks,
to study the evolution of innovation networks. We show how dierent modalities of interations
between rms and ost funtions related to these interations an give rise to ompletely dier-
ent equilibrium networks. We have studied the ase of linear ost and bilateral interations in
König et al. (2007b,a). There we nd that, depending on the ost, the range of possible equilib-
rium networks ontains omplete, intermediate graphs with heterogeneous degree distributions
as well as empty graphs. Here, we fous on a type of nonlinear ost and both, on unilateral and
bilateral interations. In the unilateral ase, we nd that, in a broad range of parameter values,
networks an break down ompletely or the equilibrium network is very sparse and onsists of
few pairwise interations and many isolated agents. Equilibrium networks with a higher density
an be reahed if (i) the utility funtion of the agents aounts for a positive externality result-
ing from being part of a tehnologial feedbak loop or if (ii) all interations are bidiretional
(diret reiproal). Otherwise the network ollapses and only few, if any, agents an beneially
exhange knowledge.
The results found in our novel approah to evolving innovation networks are summarized in
setion (6.1). The appendix shall be useful for the reader interested in more numerial results
and the parameters and explanation of the algorithms used.
12
For an exellent introdution see Jakson (2007), Vega-Redondo (2007) and Goyal (2007).
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2 Basi Models of Innovation Networks
2.1 Graph Theoreti Network Charaterization
Before we start to desribe spei models of eonomi networks, we give a brief introdution to
the most important graph theoreti terms used throughout this hapter to haraterize networks.
For a broader introdution to graph theory see West (2001). In this hapter we will use the terms
graph and network interhangeably, i.e. both refer to the same objet. The same holds for nodes
and nodes as well as links and links.
A graph G is a pair, G = (V,E), onsisting of a node set V (G) and an link set E(G). Kn is the
omplete graph on n nodes. Cn the yle on n nodes. Nodes i and j are the endpoints of the link
eij ∈ E(G).
The degree, di, of a node i is the number of links inident to it. A graph an either be undireted
or direted, where in the latter ase one has to distinguish between in-degree, d−i , and out-
degree, d+i , of node i. In the ase of an undireted graph, the neighborhood of a node i in
G is Ni = {w ∈ V (G) : ewi ∈ E(G)}. The degree of a node i is then di = |Ni|. The rst
order neighborhood is just the neighborhood, Ni, of node i. The seond order neighborhood is,
Ni ∪ {Nv : v ∈ Ni}. Similarly, higher order neighborhoods are dened. In the ase of a direted
graph we denote the out-neighborhood of node i by N+i and the in-neighborhood by N
−
i . A
graph G is regular if all nodes have the same degree. A graph G is k− regular if every node has
degree k.
A walk is an alternating list, {v0, e01, v1, ..., vk−1, ek−1k, vk}, of nodes and links. A trail is a walk
with no repeated link. A path is a walk with no repeated node. The shortest path between two
nodes is also known as the geodesi distane. If the endpoints of a trail are the same (a losed
trail) then we refer to it as a iruit. A iruit with no repeated node is alled a yle.
A subgraph, G′, of G is the graph of subsets of the nodes, V (G′) ⊆ V (G), and links, E(G′) ⊆
E(G). A graph G is onneted, if there is a path onneting every pair of nodes. Otherwise G is
disonneted. The omponents of a graph G are the maximal onneted subgraphs.
The adjaeny matrix, A(G), of G, is the n-by-n matrix in whih the entry aij is 1 if the link
eij ∈ E(G), otherwise aij is 0. For an undireted graphA is symmetri, i.e. aij = aji ∀i, j ∈ V (G).
An example of a graph and its assoiated adjaeny matrix is given in Fig. (1). For example, in
the rst row with elements, a11 = 0, a12 = 1, a13 = 0, a14 = 0, the element a12 = 1 indiates that
there exist an link from node 1 to node 2.
In a bipartite graph G, V (G) is the union of two disjoint independent sets V1 and V2. In a
bipartite graph, if e12 ∈ E(G) then v1 ∈ V1 and v2 ∈ V2. In other words, the two endpoints of
any link must be in dierent sets. The omplete bipartite graph with partitions of size |V1| = n
and |V2| = m is denoted Kn,m. A speial ase is the star whih is a omplete bipartite graph
with one partition having size n = 1, K1,m.
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A =


0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0

 1
2
4
3
Figure 1: (Right) a direted graph onsisting of 4 nodes and 5 links. (Left) the orresponding
adjaeny matrix A
There exists an important lass of graphs, random graphs, whih are determined by their number
of nodes, n, and the (independent) probability p of eah link being present in the graph (Bollobas,
1985).
We now introdue two topologial measures of a graph, the lustering oeient and the average
path length. For further details see e.g. Newman (2003) and Costa et al. (2007). The following
denitions assume undireted graphs.
For eah node, the loal lustering oeient, Ci, is simply dened as the fration of pairs of
neighbors of i that are themselves neighbors. The number of possible neighbors of node i is
simply di(di − 1)/2. Thus we get
Ci =
|{ejk ∈ E(G) : eij ∈ E(G) ∧ eik ∈ E(G)}|
di(di − 1)/2 (1)
The global lustering oeient C is then given by
C =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ci (2)
A high lustering oeient C means (in the language of soial networks), that the friend of your
friend is likely also to be your friend. It also indiates a high redundany of the network.
The average path length l is the mean geodesi (i.e. shortest) distane between node pairs in a
graph:
l =
1
1
2n(n− 1)
n∑
i≥j
dij (3)
where dij is the geodesi distane from node i to node j.
In setion ( 2.3) we will show a model of innovation networks that produes small-worlds whih
ombine the two properties of a high lustering oeient and a small average path length.
In the following setions we will desribe some basi models of eonomi network theory, where
we shall use the denitions and notations introdued above.
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2.2 The Connetions Model
The onnetions model introdued by Jakson and Wolinsky (1996) is of spei interest sine
it allows us to ompute equilibrium networks analytially. The sueeding models an then be
onsidered as extension of the onnetions model. Sine these models are more ompliated
than the basi onnetions model they an, to a large extent, only by studied via omputer
simulations
13
. Nevertheless they are of interest beause they show a wider range of possible
network ongurations and assoiated performane of the agents in the eonomy.
In the following we disuss the (symmetri) onnetions model proposed by
Jakson and Wolinsky (1996)
14
In this model agents pass information to those to whom
they are onneted to. Through these links they also reeive information from those agents
that they are indiretly onneted to, that is, trough the neighbors of their neighbors, their
neighbors, and so on.
The individual inentives to form or severe links determine the addition or deletion of links.
Inentives are dened in terms of the utility of the agents whih depends on the interations
among agents, i.e. the network. The utility funtions assigns a payo to every agent as a funtion
of the network the agents are nested in.
The utility, ui(G), agent i reeives from network G with n agents is a funtion ui : {G ∈ Gn} → R
with
ui(G) =
n∑
j=1
δdij −
∑
j∈Ni
c (4)
where dij is the number of links in the shortest path between agent i and agent j. dij = ∞ if
there is no path between i and j. 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is a parameter that takes into aount the derease
of the utility as the path between agent i and agent j inreases. N(i) is the set of nodes in the
neighborhood of agent i. In this model the network is undireted.
A measure of the global performane of the network is introdued by its eieny. The total
utility of a network is dened by
U(G) =
n∑
i=1
ui(G) (5)
A network is onsidered eient if it maximizes the total utility of the network U(G) among all
possible networks, G(n) with n nodes.
Denition 1 A network G is strongly eient if U(G) =
∑n
i=1 ui(G) ≥ U(G′) =
∑n
i=1 ui(G
′)
for all G′ ∈ G(n)
13
For the use of omputer simulations in eonomis see Axelrod and Tesfatsion (2006)
14
For a good introdution and disussion of related works we reommend the leture notes of Zenou (2006).
There one an nd the proofs given here and related material in more detail. For a general introdution to
eonomi networks see also Jakson (2006).
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Under ertain onditions no new links are aepted or old ones deleted. This leads to the term
pairwise stability.
Denition 2 A network G is pairwise stable if and only if
1. for all eij ∈ E(G), ui(G) ≥ ui(E\eij) and uj(G) ≥ uj(E\eij)
2. for all eij /∈ E(G), if ui(G) < ui(E ∪ eij) then ui(G) > uj(E ∪ eij)
In words, a network is pairwise stable if and only if (i) removing any link does not inrease the
utility of any agent, and (ii) adding a link between any two agents, either does not inrease
the utility of any of the two agents, or if it does inrease one of the two agents' utility then it
dereases the other agent's utility.
The point here is that establishing a new link with an agent requires the onsensus (i.e. a simul-
taneous inrease of utility) of both of them. The notion of pairwise stability an be distinguished
from the one of Nash equilibrium
15
whih is appropriate when eah agent an establish or remove
unilaterally a onnetion with another agent.
There exists a tension between stability and eieny in the onnetions model. This will beome
lear, after we derive the following two propositions.
Proposition 3 The unique strongly eient network in the symmetri onnetions model is
1. the omplete graph Kn if c < δ − δ2,
2. a star enompassing everyone if δ − δ2 < c < δ + n−22 δ2
3. the empty graph (no links) if δ + n−22 δ
2 < c.
Proof. 1. We assume that δ2 < δ− c. Any pair of agents that is not diretly onneted an
inrease its utility (the net benet for reating a link is δ − c− δ2 > 0) and thus the total
utility, by forming a link. Sine every pair of agents has an inentive to form a link, we
will end up in the omplete graph Kn, where all possible links have been reated and no
additional links an be reated any more.
2. Consider a omponent of the graph G ontaining m agents, say G′. The number of links in
the omponent G′ is denoted by k, where k ≥ m− 1, otherwise the omponent would not
be onneted. E.g. a path ontaining all agents would have m− 1 links. The total utility of
the diret links in the omponent is given by k(sδ− 2c). There are at most m(m−1)2 − k left
15
Considering two agents playing a game (e.g. trading of knowledge) and eah adopting a ertain strategy. A
Nash equilibrium is haraterized by a set of strategies where eah strategy is the optimal response to all the
others.
13/84
Mihael D. König, Stefano Battiston, Frank Shweitzer: Modeling Evolving Innovation Networks
In: Innovation Networks - New Approahes in Modeling and Analyzing (Eds. A. Pyka, A. Sharnhorst)
Heidelberg: Springer, 2008
1 2
3
4
Figure 2: A star enompassing 4 agents.
over links in the omponent, that are not reated yet. The utility of eah of these left over
links is at most 2δ2 (it has the highest utility if it is in the seond order neighborhood).
Therefor the total utility of the omponent is at most
k2(δ − c) +
(
m(m− 1)
2
− k
)
2δ2 (6)
Consider a star K1,m−1 with m agents. The star has m − 1 agents whih are not in the
enter of the star. An example of a star with 4 agents is given in Fig. (2). The utility of
any diret link is 2δ− 2c and of any indiret link (m− 2)δ2, sine any agent is 2 links away
from any other agent (exept the enter of the star). Thus the total utility of the star is
(m− 1)(2δ − 2c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
diret onnetions
+(m− 1)(m− 2)δ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
indiret onnetions
(7)
The dierene in total utility of the (general) omponent and the star is just 2(k − (m −
1))(δ−c−δ2). This is at most 0, sine k ≥ m−1 and c > δ−δ2, and less than 0 if k > m−1.
Thus, the value of the omponent an equal the value of the star only if k = m − 1. Any
graph with k = m− 1 edges, whih is not a star, must have an indiret onnetion with a
distane longer than 2, and getting a total utility less than 2δ2. Therefore the total utility
from indiret onnetions of the indiret links will be below (m−1)(m−2)δ2 (whih is the
total utility from indiret onnetions of the star). If c < δ − δ2, then any omponent of a
strongly eient network must be a star.
Similarly it an be shown (Jakson and Wolinsky, 1996) that a single star of m+n agents
has a higher total utility than two separate stars with m and n agents. Aordingly, if a
strongly eient network is non-empty, it must be a star.
3. A star enompassing every agent has a positive value only if δ + n−22 δ
2 > c. This is an
upper bound for the total ahievable utility of any omponent of the network. Thus, if
δ + n−22 δ
2 < c the empty graph is the unique strongly eient network.
Proposition 4 In the onnetions model in whih the utility of eah agent is given by (4), we
have
1. A pairwise stable network has at most one (non-empty) omponent.
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2. For c < δ − δ2, the unique pairwise stable network is the omplete graph Kn.
3. For δ − δ2 < c < δ a star enompassing every agent is pairwise stable, but not neessarily
the unique pairwise stable graph.
4. For δ < c, any pairwise stable network that is non-empty is suh that eah agent has at
least two links (and thus is eient).
Proof. 1. Lets assume, for the sake of ontradition, that G is pairwise stable and has more
than one non-empty omponent. Let uij denote the utility of agent i having a link with agent
j. Then, uij = ui(G+eij)−ui(G) if eij /∈ E(G) and uij = ui(G)−ui(G−eij) if eij ∈ E(G).
We onsider now eij ∈ E(G). Then uij ≥ 0. Let ekl belong to a dierent omponent. Sine
i is already in a omponent with j, but k is not, it follows that ujk > uij ≥ 0, beause
agent k will reeive an additional utility of δ2 from being indiretly onneted to agent i.
For similar reasons ujk > ulk ≥ 0. This means that both agents in the separate omponent
would have an inentive to form a link. This is a ontradition to the assumption of pairwise
stability.
2. The net hange in utility from reating a link is δ − δ2 − c. Before reating the link, the
geodesi distane between agent i and agent j is at least 2. When they reate a link, they
gain δ but they lose the previous utility from being indiretly onneted by some path whose
length is at least 2. So if c < δ − δ2, the net gain from reating a link is always positive.
Sine any link reation is beneial (inreases the agents' utility), the only pairwise stable
network is the omplete graph, Kn.
3. We assume that δ − δ2 < c− δ and show that the star is pairwise stable. The agent in the
enter of the star has a distane of 1 to all other agents and all other agents are separated
by 2 links from eah other. The enter agent of the star annot reate a link, sine she has
already maximum degree. She has no inentive to delete a link either. If she deletes a link,
the net gain is c − δ, sine there is no path leading to the then disonneted agent. By
assumption, δ − δ2 < c < δ, c − δ < 0 and the gain is negative, and the link will not be
removed. We onsider now an agent that is not the enter of the star. She annot reate
a link with the enter, sine they are both already onneted. The net gain of reating a
link to another agent is δ− δ2− c, whih is stritly negative by assumption. So she will not
reate a link either. The star is pairwise stable.
The star enompasses all agents. Suppose an agent would not be onneted to the star. If
the enter of the star would reate a link to this agent, the net gain would be δ − c > 0
and the benet of the non-star agent is again δ − c > 0. So both will reate the link.
The star is not the unique pairwise stable network. We will show that for 4 agents, the
yle, C4 is also a pairwise stable network. Consider Fig. (3)
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34
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Figure 3: A yle of 4 agents (left) and the resulting graph (right) after the deletion of a link
from agent 3 to agent 4.
1 2
34
1 2
34
Figure 4: A yle of 4 agents (left) and the resulting graph (right) after the reation of a link
from agent 3 to agent 1.
If agent 3 removes a link to agent 4, then her net gain is c− δ − δ3. For the range of osts
of δ − δ2 < c < δ − δ3 < δ, she will never do it. If agent 3 adds a link to agent 1, Fig. (4),
the net gain is δ − δ2 < 0. Thus, for n = 4 and δ − δ2 < c < δ − δ3, then there are at least
two pairwise stable networks: the star and the yle.
4. For δ < c the star is not a pairwise stable network beause the agent in the enter of the star
would gain c − δ from deleting a link. Moreover, it an be shown (Jakson and Wolinsky,
1996) that any onneted agent has at least 2 links.
One an see, from the two propositions desribed above, that a pairwise stable network is not
neessarily eient. For high ost, i.e. c > δ there are non-empty pairwise stable networks but
they are not eient.
We now ome to the evolution of the network as desribed in Jakson and Watts (2002). The
network hanges when agents reate or delete a link. At every time step an agent is hosen at
random and tries to establish a new link or delete an already existing one. If a link is added,
then the two agents involved must both agree to its addition, with at least one of them stritly
beneting (in terms of a higher utility) of the new link. Similarly a deletion of a link an only be in
a mutual agreement. This adding and deleting of links reates a sequene of networks. A sequene
of networks reated by agents myopially adding and deleting links is alled an improving path
16
(Jakson and Watts, 2002).
There is a small probability, ǫ, that a mistake ours (trembling hand) and the link is deleted
if present or added if absent. ǫ goes to zero in the long run, limt→∞ ǫ(t) = 0. By introduing
16
Eah network in the sequene of network updates diers in one link from the previous one. An improving
path is a nite set of networks G1, ..., Gk in whih one agents is better o by deleting a link (Gk+1 has one link
less than Gk) or two agents are better o by adding a link (Gk+1 has one link more than Gk).
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this dereasing error ǫ in the agent's deisions, the evolution of the network beomes a Markov
proess
17
with a unique limiting stationary distribution of networks visited (Jakson and Watts,
2002). The following denition is important to desribe the stohasti evolution of the network.
Denition 5 A network is evolutionary stable if it is in the limiting stationary distribution of
networks of the above mentioned Markov proess.
We have already investigated the struture and stability of the star, Fig. (2), and the yle, Fig.
(3). In Jakson and Watts (2002) it is shown that for the ase of 4 agents, the evolutionary stable
networks indeed are the stars and yles. So the network of agents evolves into a quite simple
equilibrium onguration.
2.3 The Connetions Model and Small-World Networks
Carayol and Roux (2005, 2003) propose a model of innovation networks in whih networks emerge
that show the properties of a small world
18
. This model is an extension of the above desribed
onnetions model, se. (2.2), and it uses the same notion of pairwise stability and eieny
19
.
We now give a sketh of the model. Agents are loalized on a yle and benet from knowledge
ows from their diret and indiret neighbors. Knowledge transfer deays along paths longer than
one link. This means that less knowledge is reeived, the longer the path between the not diretly
onneted agents is. The transfer rate is ontrolled by an exogenous parameter, δ. Eah agent
has a probability to innovate, that is dependent on her amount of knowledge. The knowledge
level of an agent is dependent on two fators. (i) the in-house innovative apabilities of the agent
and (ii) the knowledge ows oming diretly from the neighbors or indiretly (with a ertain
attenuation fator) from those agents that are onneted to the neighbors.
Agent i supports osts, ci(t), for diret onnetions whih are linearly inreasing with geographi
distane, that is the distane on the yle on whih they reede. Agent i's utility ui at a time t
is given by the following expression.
ui(G(t)) =
∑
j∈Ni
δdij − c
∑
j∈Ni
d′ij , (8)
where dij is the geodesi distane between agent i and agent j. δ ∈ (0, 1) is a knowledge deay
parameter and δdij gives the payos resulting from the diret or indiret onnetion between
17
A Markov proess is a random proess whose future states are determined by its present state and not on the
past states, i.e. it is onditionally independent on the past states given the present state.
18
A small-world network ombines high lustering (high probability that your aquaintanes are also a-
quaintanes to eah other) with a short harateristi path length (small average distane between two
nodes)(Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
19
A network is pairwise stable if and only if (i) removing any link does not inrease the utility of any agent,
and (ii) adding a link between any two agents, either does not inrease the utility of any of the two agents, or if it
does inrease one of the two agents' utility then it dereases the other agent's utility. It is eient if it maximizes
total utility.
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agent i and agent j. d′ij desribes the geographi distane between agent i and agent j, that
is the distane on the yle. This is the main dierene in the assumptions ompared to the
onnetions model disussed in se. (2.2).
Agents are able to modify their onnetions. This is were the network beomes dynami. Pairs of
agents are randomly seleted. If the seleted two agents are diretly onneted they an jointly
deide to maintain a link or unilaterally deide to sever the link. If they are not onneted, they
an jointly deide to form a link. The deision is guided by the selshness of the agents, whih
means that they only aept links from whih they get a higher utility.
The stohasti proess of adding links to the network an be seen as a Markov proess where eah
state is the graph struture at a ertain time step. The evolution of the system is a disrete time
stohasti proess with the state spae of all possible graphs. A small random perturbation where
the agents make mistakes in taking the optimal deision to form a link or not is introdued. Agents
are making errors with a probability ǫ(t). This error term dereases with time, limt→∞ ǫ(t) = 0.
The introdution of ǫ enables us to nd long-run stationary distributions that are independent
of initial onditions (the ergodiity of the system) (Jakson and Watts, 2002). Simulations are
used in order to nd these stationary distributions. Agents are forming and severing links until
the network reahes a pairwise stable onguration where the agents have no inentive to reate
or delete links any more. The set of stohastially stable networks seleted in the long run is
aeted by the rate of knowledge transfer, δ. The authors nd ritial values of this parameter
for whih stable small world networks are dynamially seleted. This is the main dierene in
the resulting equilibrium network struture to the onnetions model, in whih simpler network
ongurations are obtained.
2.4 Introduing Heterogeneous Knowledge
Riottilli (2006, 2005) studies the evolution of a network of agents that improve their tehnologial
apabilities through interation while knowledge is heterogeneously distributed among agents.
In addition to the sharing of knowledge, eah agent is assumed to have an in-house innovative
apability. Considerable eort is neessary for this in-house researh and as researh is not
always suessful, it is assumed to hange stohastially.
An agent i's innovation apability, Vi, is given by
Vi(t) =
N∑
j=1
aijbij(t)Vj(t) + Ci(t) (9)
with an eonomy onsisting of n agents. aij =onst. is the broadasting apaity of agent j
to agent i and aii = 0 sine no agent an broadast information to herself. The matrix A with
elements aij indiates the total tehnologial information broadasting apability of this eonomy.
The proximity matrix elements bij(t) are either 0 or 1 aording to whether agent j is identied
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from agent i as an information supplier. This is the neighborhood of agent i. Ci(t) ∈ (0, 1) is the
in-house apability of agent i. This is a stohasti variable.
Eah agent i assesses the value of knowledge of its neighbors (where bij 6= 0), whih are the
addends of the rst term in (9). From this funtion the least ontributing one, denoted by γi(t),
is seleted.
γi(t) = min1≤j≤N{aijbij(t− 1)Vj(t− 1)} (10)
In a random replaement proedure (searh routine) an agent selets either its neighbors and
seond neighbors (loal, weak bounded rationality) or the entire eonomy exluding its rst and
seond neighbors (global, strong bounded rationality). By doing so, agent i assigns a new member
j to the set of information suppliers, setting bij from 0 to 1. This seletion is only aepted if
Vi(t) > Vi(t− 1) (11)
The population of agents is lassied aording to the size of the set of other agents by whih
they are observed. Global paradigm setters are agents that are observed by almost all agents in
the eonomy. Loal paradigm setters are observed by almost all agents belonging to the same
omponent.
Simulations of the evolution of the network show that stable patterns emerge. When the
knowledge-heterogeneity of the eonomy is not very high, global paradigm setters emerge. For
high levels of heterogeneity the eonomy beomes partitioned in two separate halves. In eah
homogeneous one, loal paradigm setters emerge. Riottilli (2006, 2005) shows that the highest
tehnologial apabilities are ahieved neither with a loal searh routine in whih only the se-
ond neighbors are inluded nor in global searh routines that span the whole eonomy. Rather a
ombination of both improves the system's innovative eieny the most.
2.5 Emerging Cyli Network Topologies
When studying multi-setor trading eonomies and input-output systems Rosenblatt (1957) al-
ready identied the importane of irular ows and feed-bak input dependenies between
industries (realized by subgraphs alled yli nets). A suient ondition for a strongly on-
neted network (in whih there exits a path from every agent to every other agent and that has
an irreduible adjaeny matrix) is the existene of a yle. Subsequent works (Maxeld, 1994;
Baldry and Ghosal, 2005) have further inorporated the onditions of strong onnetedness and
yles for the existene for a ompetitive eonomy. More reently, Kim and Wong (2007) study
a generalized model of Bala and Goyal (2000) and nd that the equilibrium networks onsist of
yles (so alled sub-wheel partitions).
In the following setions we will fous on some reent network models of knowledge transation
and innovation (the reation of new knowledge) in whih yli interations of agents emerge.
In setion 3 we will study a new model of evolving innovation networks. Similarly to the above
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mentioned authors we nd that the existene of equilibrium networks with a positive knowledge
prodution depends ritially on the existene of yles in the network.
2.5.1 Prodution Reipes and Artifats
In the following setions we will fous on network models of knowledge transation and inno-
vation, the reation of new knowledge, in whih yli interations of agents emerge. We start
by reviewing a model by Lane (2005) in whih agents try to produe and sell artifats. These
artifats an be manufatured aording to a prodution reipe. Suh a reipe an either be found
independently or through the sharing of knowledge with other agents, whih in turn an lead to
an innovation, that is the disovery of a new reipe.
Let us denote with rik the k
th
reipe of agent i. There is an external environment whih onsists
of external agents (ustomers) and artifats whih are not produed in the model. At eah time
period t one agent i is randomly hosen. Then the following steps are taken:
1. The agent tries to get the input required for eah reipe rik. If it is in the agent's own
stok then she an produe immediately. If it is not, she buys it from another agent and if
it annot be bought she moves to another reipe.
2. The agent hooses a goal, i.e. the produt she wants to produe (one that gives high sales).
Therefore she has to nd the right reipe for the goal. She produes the produt if a
suessful reipe is found. This an be ahieved in two ways. The agent either an try to
innovate by herself or she an try to innovate together with another agent.
3. The wealth of agent i at time t+ 1, wi(t), is alulated aording to
wi(t+ 1) = wi(t) +
Nk∑
k=1
nik(t)− wi(t)
Nl∑
l=1
pilcil − λwi(t) (12)
where Nk is the number of produts sold, nik(t) is the number of units sold of produt
k belonging to agent i, pil is the number produts produed with reipe ril and cil is the
prodution ost.
The last term −λwi(t) guarantees that the wealth of an agent that has not sold any produts
and does not have any ative reipes vanishes.
4. The reipes that ould not be suessfully used to produe produts are aneled.
5. The set of aquaintanes of an agent is enlarged. This is possible when two or more agents,
that have goals whih are lose in artifat spae (i.e. they require similar inputs) ooperate
to produe that artifat.
6. With a ertain probability dead agents are substituted.
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The basi dynamis, absent innovation, is one of prodution and sales, where the supply of raw
materials is external as well as nal produt demand. There are two main dierenes to most
agent-based innovation models. First, here the agents try to develop new reipes in order to
produe produts with high sales, as opposed to many agent-based models where the generation
of novelty is driven by some stohasti proess. Seond, in simulations Lane (2005) shows that
the network of ustomers and suppliers often forms losed, self-sustaining yles.
2.5.2 An Autoatalyti Model with Hyperyles
Padgett et al. (2003); Padgett (1996) introdues an autoatalyti model, based on a hyperyle
20
model. Here agents are represented as skills and these skills are ombined in order to produe.
Skills, like hemial reations, are rules that transform produts into other produts.
In the following we will give a short overview of the model
21
. There are two main aspets in
the dynamis interation of the agents: The proess of prodution and the proess of learning.
The proess of prodution inludes three entities: skills, produts and agents. Skills transform
produts into other produts. The skills are features of the agents. On a spatial grid the agents are
arrayed with periodi boundaries. Eah agent has eight possible neighbors. At eah asynhronous
iteration a random skill is hosen. An agent with that skill randomly hooses an input produt.
If this produt ts to the skill then the produt is transformed. The transformed produt is
passed randomly to the neighbors of the agent. If the trading partner has the neessary skill it
transforms the produt further and passes it on. If the agent doesn't have the ompatible skill,
the produt is ejeted into the output environment and a new input produt is seleted.
One an look at the prodution proess from a wider perspetive. An input produt omes from
the environment, then passes through prodution hains of skills until it is passed bak as output
to the environment. These hains self-organize beause of a feedbak mehanism of the agents.
This mehanism is learning through the trade of produts.
The proess of learning is modelled as learning by doing. If a skill transforms a produt and then
passes it on to another transforming skill, then the skill is reprodued (learned). Whenever one
skill is reprodued anywhere in the system then another one is deleted at random to keep the
overall number of skills onstant. The agents are able to learn new skills by doing and they an
forget skills they didn't use for a ertain period of time. This proedure of learning introdues a
feedbak mehanism. When an agent loses all its skills, then it is assumed to never reover.
In Padgett et al. (2003); Padgett (1996) the emergene of self-reinforing hyperyle prodution
hains is shown. In these hyperyles agents reprodue eah other through ontinuous learning.
Suh yles generate a positive growth eet on the reprodution of skills. Thus, even in a
20
A hyperyle is a system whih onnets self-repliative units through a yle linkage (Eigen and Shuster,
1979).
21
This agent based model is publily available on the website http://repast.soureforge.net/examples/index.html
under the appliation module hyperyle.
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ompetitive environment the sharing of knowledge is ruial to the long-run performane of the
system.
3 A New Model of Evolving Innovation Networks
3.1 Outline of the Modeling Framework
In this setion we study the evolution of networks of agents exhanging knowledge
22
in a novel
framework. The network an evolve over time either, by an external seletion mehanism that re-
plaes the worst performing agent with a new one or, by a loal mehanism, in whih agents take
deisions on forming or removing a link. In the latter ase, we investigate dierent modalities
of interation between agents, namely bilateral interations, representing R&D ollaborations
(Hagedoorn et al., 2000, 2006) or informal knowledge trading (Von Hippel, 1987), versus unilat-
eral interations (similar to Bala and Goyal (2000) agents deide unilaterally whom to onnet
to), representing a generalization of informal knowledge trading. We further study the impat of
varying osts for maintaining links and the impat of augmenting or diminishing eets on the
value of knowledge with the number of users assoiated with dierent types of knowledge. Our
model exhibits equilibrium networks and we ompare their struture and performane. Similar
to the models disussed in the last setion we will show that yli patterns in the interations
between agents play an important role for the stability (permanene) and performane of the
system.
We study dierent assumptions on the behavior of agents. In most simple ase, denoted by
Extremal Dynamis, agents form links at random and, through an external market seletion
mehanism, the worst performing agent (this is where the denotation extremal stems from) is
replaed with a new one. In this setting agents are ompletely passive and they are exposed to
a least-t seletion mehanism.
In a more realisti setting, alled Utility Driven Dynamis, agents hoose with whom to interat,
but their behavior is still boundedly rational and does not onsider strategi interation. The
way in whih agents reate or delete links to other agents is a trial and error proess for nding
the right partner. Here we study two dierent modes of interation. In the rst interation
mode, agents are reating bilateral links. Bilateral links represent formal R&D ollaborations
among agents (Hagedoorn et al., 2000), or informal knowledge trading (Von Hippel, 1987). In
the seond interation mode, agents are transferring knowledge unilaterally, whih means that
one agent may transfer her knowledge to another but the reverse is not mandatory. In this setting,
the transfer of knowledge may be reiproated, but knowledge an also be returned from a third
party. In the latter ase, we speak of indiret reiproity. If knowledge is transferred unilaterally,
22
See also the hapter of Robin Cowan and Niolas Jonard in this book as well as Cowan and Jonard (2004);
Cowan et al. (2004).
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the innovation network an be represented as a direted graph omprising unilateral links, while
if all interations are bilateral, the innovation network an be represented as an undireted graph.
In the setting of unilateral links we also investigate the impat of additional benets from network
externalities. These benets onsider spei strutural properties of networks whih have an
augmenting eet on the value of knowledge. We study two dierent types of network properties
whih inrease the value of knowledge. We all these types Positive Network Externalities. The
rst Positive Network Externality onsiders the fator that, the more the entrality of an agent
rises with the reation of a link, the higher is the benet from that link. A high entrality indiates
that an agent is onneted to other agents through short paths. This means that, when knowledge
travels along short distanes between agents, it has a higher value than knowledge that has to
be passed on between many agents. This eet an be aptured by introduing an attenuation
of knowledge with the distane it has to travel (by getting passed on from one agent to the
next) until reahing an agent. The seond Positive Network Externality aptures an opposite
eet when knowledge is passed on from one agent to the next. Here the value of knowledge
inreases with the number of transmitters (who are also user) of that knowledge. More preisely,
we assume that feedbak loops reate an inrease in the value of knowledge of the agents that
are part of the loop. The more agents absorb and pass on knowledge the higher is the value of
that knowledge. This means that a link that is part of a long feedbak loop inreases the value
of the knowledge passed on from one agent to the next
23
.
We an summarize the dierent settings that are studied in this setion as follows. We investi-
gate the performane and evolution under the two aforementioned assumptions on the behavior
of agents, namely Extremal Dynamis and Utility Driven Dynamis. In the latter setting, we
further study the eet of dierent modes of interation, i.e. bilateral and unilateral knowledge
transations among agents. When studying unilateral interation among agents, we introdue
dierent augmenting proesses on the value of knowledge depending on the struture of the net-
work, alled Positive Network Externality. We study the impat of an attenuation of the value
of knowledge by the distane from the giver to the reeiver as well as the ontrary eet of an
inrease of the value of knowledge with the number of users of that knowledge depending on the
type of knowledge under investigation. Finally, we disuss the networks obtained under these
dierent settings with respet to their topologies and performane.
3.1.1 Bilateral versus Unilateral Knowledge Exhange
We interpret bilateral interations as R&D ollaborations on a formal or informal basis
(Hagedoorn et al., 2000). Both parties involved share their knowledge in a reiproal way, that
means one agent is giving knowledge to another if and only if the other agent is doing this as
well and both agents benet from this transation.
23
We study losed loops, beause we assume that knowledge issued from one agent has to return to that agent
in order for her to take advantage of this added value of knowledge (reated by the multipliity of other users).
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We then ompare bilateral interation with the ase of agents sharing knowledge in a unidire-
tional way with other agents. They then maintain only those interations that are in some form
reiproated (and this way lead to an inrease in their knowledge levels after a ertain time)
but not neessarily from the agent they initially gave their knowledge to (indiret reiproity).
The latter is referred to unilateral knowledge exhange whih an be seen as a generalization of
informal knowledge trading.
In the ase of informal knowledge trading agents exhange knowledge if both stritly benet.
Instead, in the ase of generalized informal knowledge trading, one agent transfers knowledge
to another one without immediately getting something bak. After a ertain time (time horizon
T ) an agent evaluates its investment by assessing its total net inrease in knowledge. By intro-
duing unilateral knowledge exhange we relax two requirements: (i) we do not require that the
investment in sharing ones knowledge has to be reiproated instantaneously and in a mutually
onerted way. And (ii) the reiproation does not neessarily have to ome from the same agent.
With this generalization we introdue that (i) agents have only limited information on the value
of knowledge of others and on the network of interations. (ii) Agents proeed in a trial and
error fashion to nd the right partners for exhanging their knowledge. In this setting reiproity
emerges either diretly or indiretly.
If the total knowledge level of an agent at the time horizon T is higher than it was when the
agent started to share her knowledge with another agent, this interation is evaluated beneial,
otherwise it is not. Only if the interation is evaluated beneial, the agent ontinues sharing
its knowledge with the other agent, otherwise it stops the interation. This proedure requires
only limited information on the other agents, sine the agent ares for its own total inrease in
knowledge and does not need to evaluate the individual knowledge levels of others. We desribe
this link formation mehanism in more detail in setion (4.3).
3.2 Unilateral Knowledge Exhange and Reiproity
If the interation of agents are unilateral then agents invest into innovation by sharing knowl-
edge with other agents. An investment is an advane payment with the expetation to earn
future prots. When one agent transfers knowledge to another one without immediately getting
something bak, this an be regarded as an investment. There are usually two ways in whih an
investment an be expeted to bring in reasonable returns.
One way is the reation of ontrats. As a preondition for ontrats tehnologies must be pro-
tetable (IPR). Otherwise agents an not trade them (one the tehnology is oered, i.e. made
publi, everybody an simply opy it and there is no more need to pay for it). Contrats must
be binding and omplete (Dikhaut and Rustihini, 2001). The ontrat has to be binding or
agents may not meet their agreement after the payment has been made. It has to be omplete,
or unertain agreements may lead agents to interpret it in a way most favorable to their position
and this an ause agents to retreat from the ontrat.
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The requirements for ontrats an be diult to realize. Another way is to expet reiproative
behavior to the investment. The beneiary an either diretly or indiretly reiproate the
benet. Diret reiproity means to respond in kind to the investor, and indiret reiproity to
reward someone else than the original investor.
One of the possible explanations for reiproal behavior (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005, 1998;
Fehr and Fishbaher, 2003; Fehr and Shmidt, 1999; Bolton and Okenfels, 2000), (see e.g.
Diekmann, 2004, for a survey) is to assume the existene of reputation. Agents believe that
if they invest into another agent they will inrease their reputation and then realize a reasonable
return oming bak to them diretly or indiretly (strategi reputation building).
In reality, only partial information about reputation is available and experimental works show
that, even in the absene of reputation, there is a non-negligible amount of reiproal oop-
erative behavior among humans (Bolton et al., 2005). As Dikhaut and Rustihini (2001) put
it, ...investment ours even though agents annot reate binding ontrats nor reate reputa-
tion. Thus, agents invest into eah other by transferring their knowledge even if they annot
immediately evaluate the benet from this investment.
We assume that agents are not a priori reiproating if they reeive knowledge from others. But
they pereive, that interations that are reiproated in some way are beneial (inreasing their
own knowledge) and these are the interations that they maintain in the long run.
The problems assoiated with bilateral exhange of knowledge (diret reiproity) and experi-
mental evidene suggest that unilateral knowledge exhange, in whih indiret reiproity an
emerge, is a relevant mode of interation between agents. Moreover, the fat that interations
between anonymous partners beome inreasingly frequent in global markets and tend to replae
the traditional long-lasting mutual business relationships poses a hallenge to eonomi theory
and is one of the reason for the growing interest about indiret reiproity in the eonomi
literature.
3.2.1 Indiret Reiproity, Direted Graphs and Cyles
An R&D network an be desribed as a graph in whih agents are represented by nodes, and
their interations by direted links. Indeed, as mentioned above, if agent i transfers knowledge
to agent j (e.g. by providing a new tehnology), the reverse proess, i.e. that agent j in turn
transfers knowledge to i, is in priniple not mandatory. This means that the links representing
the transfer of knowledge are direted. The underlying graph an be represented by an adjaeny
matrix, A with elements aij ∈ [0, 1], whih is not symmetri, aij 6= aji. In other words, direted
means that we distinguish the pairs (i, j) and (j, i) representing the links from i to j and from
j to i, respetively. On the other hand, if the adjaeny matrix is symmetri, it means that any
two agents are onneted both by a link from i to j and by a link from j to i. We say, in this
ase, that they are onneted by a bidiretional link. Notie that the symmetry also implies that
the two links have idential weights.
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Reiproity requires the presene of yles. In partiular, diret reiproity orresponds to a yle
of order k = 2, while indiret reiproity orresponds to a yle of order k ≥ 3 (see Fig. 3.2.1).
Therefore, the emergene and permanene of diret/indiret reiproity is deeply onneted to
the existene of yles and in the graph of interations.
1 2
Figure 5: A yle of length 2 represents an
interation between agents that is diret
reiproal.
1 2
3
Figure 6: A yle of length 3 (or longer)
represents an interation between agents
that is indiret reiproal.
3.3 Formal Modeling Framework
In this setion, we formalize the general framework for the investigation of evolving networks of
selsh agents engaged in knowledge prodution via the sharing of knowledge. In suh a frame-
work it is possible to investigate how the the emergene and permanene of dierent strutures
in the network is aeted by (1) the form of the growth funtion of the value of knowledge,
(2) the length of time horizon after whih interations are evaluated and (3) the link for-
mation/deletion rules. At a rst glane, this problem inludes a multitude of dimensions, as
the spae of utility funtions and link formation/deletion rules is innite. However, some natural
onstraints limit onsiderably the number of possibilities and make a systemati study possible.
In the following, we present the general framework. We then fous on a subset of the spae of
utility funtions and link formation rules. For these, we present briey some analytial results,
but sine the value of knowledge of an agent is assumed to be a nonlinear funtion of the neigh-
boring agents, we illustrate them in terms of omputer simulations. We nally summarize the
results and disuss them in relation to the ontext of innovation.
We onsider a set of agents, N = {1, ..., n}, represented as nodes of a network G, with an
assoiated variable xi representing the value of knowledge of agent i. The value of knowledge
is measured in the units of prots an agent an make in a knowledge-intensive market. It has
been shown that the growth of suh knowledge-intensive industries is highly dependent on the
number and intensity of strategi allianes in R&D networks (Powell and Grodal, 2006). In our
model we bring the value of knowledge of an agent, denoted by xi(t), at time t in relation with
the values of knowledge of the other agents xj(t) at time t in the eonomy, that are onneted to
the urrent agent i. A link from i to j, eij , takes into aount that agent i transfers knowledge
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to agent j. The idea is, that through interation, agents transfer knowledge to eah other whih
in turn inreases their values of knowledge.
We fous here only on the network eets on the value of knowledge of an agent. We therefore
neglet the eorts of agents made to innovate on their own, without the interation with others
24
.
In partiular we assume that the growth of the value of knowledge of agent i depends only on
the value of knowledge of the agents, j, with outgoing links pointing to him (those who transfer
knowledge to her), j ∈ V (G) suh that eji ∈ E(G).
In a reent study on the dynamis of R&D ollaboration networks in the US IT industry
Hanaki et al. (2007) have shown that rms form R&D ollaborations in order to maximize their
net knowledge (information) ow. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) suggested that this knowledge
ow an be deomposed in inoming and outgoing spillovers apturing the positive and negative
eets of R&D ollaborations.
We try to inorporate these positive and negative eets into a dierential equation that de-
sribes the hange (inrease or derease) in the value of knowledge of an agent through R&D
ollaborations with other agents. We assume that the knowledge growth funtion an be deom-
posed in a deay term a benet term and a ost term depending on the interations of an agent.
The equation for knowledge growth reads
dxi
dt
= −Di(xi) +Bi(A,x) − Ci(A,x) (13)
where
x˙i growth of the value of knowledge of agent i
A adjaeny matrix (representing the network)
x vetor of agents' values of knowledge
Di(xi) knowledge deay (obsolesene of knowledge)
Bi(A,x) interation benets of agent i
Ci(A,x) interation osts of agent i
B ≥ 0 and C ≥ 0 are benet and ost terms, respetively, while D ≥ 0 is a deay term
whih inludes the fat that a tehnology loses its value over time (obsolesene). In our setting,
only through R&D ollaborations with other agents, an agent an overome the obsolesene of
knowledge. This ensures that agents who do not interat with others have neessarily vanishing
value of knowledge in our model (sine Bi = Ci = 0 ⇔ aij = 0 ∀j and thus x˙i < 0). In other
words we investigate an R&D intensive eonomy in whih an agent's performane is ritially
depending on its R&D ollaborations.
24
The in-house R&D apabilities of an agent ould be introdued by an additional (stohasti) term Si(xi).
Similar to Riottilli (2006) in setion (2.5.1) Si(xi) aptures the innovation ativities of agent i without the
interation with other agents. We assume that the in-house apabilities of agents are negligible ompared to
network eets. Thus we onentrate only on network eets on the inrease or derease in the value of knowledge.
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Interation is desribed by the adjaeny matrix A that ontains the elements aij in terms of 0
and 1. This dynamis an be interpreted as a atalyti network of R&D interations (passing a
tehnology to another agent, R&D ollaborations), where the dierent agents are represented by
nodes, and their interation by links between these nodes, f. Fig. (1). More preisely,
aij =
{
1 if agents i transfers knowledge to agent j
0 otherwise
(14)
We noted already that the network of interations is modeled on a direted graph, whih means
that the adjaeny matrix is not generally symmetri: aij 6= aji.
The benet term, Bi(x,A), aounts for the fat that an agent's value of knowledge inreases
by reeiving knowledge from other agents. The ost term, Ci(x,A), aounts for the fat that
transferring knowledge to other agents is ostly. Suh a ost an vary in magnitude depending
on the tehnologial domain, but, in general, to make someone else proient in whatever new
tehnology requires a non-null eort.
In the following we will further speify the growth of the value of in (13). We will make simple
assumptions on benets, Bi(x,A), and osts, Ci(x,A), whih allow us to derive some analytial
results and thus gain some insight on the behavior of the system.
3.3.1 Pairwise Deomposition
Networks are sets of pairwise relationships. In systems of interating units in physis, a super-
position priniple holds, suh that the fore pereived by a unit is due to the sum of pairwise
interations with other units. Similarly, one ould think of deomposing both benets and osts
of eah agent i in a sum of terms related to the agents j interating with i. However, this would
imply to ignore network externalities
25
(it is very important to note this fat). We will see in the
following that externality does play an important role. So far the literature of Complex Networks
have onsidered only the pairwise interation term, while the literature on eonomi networks
has foused on some simple externalities suh as the network size, or the distane from other
agents, see setion (2.5).
Our approah is to assume that benet and ost are eah deomposable in two terms: one term
related to the diret interation, further deomposable in pairwise terms, and another term
related to externality (orresponding to positive and negative externality):
Bi(A,x) =
∑
j
bji(xj, aji) + b
e
ji(xj ,A) (15)
Ci(A,x) =
∑
j
cij(xi, aij) + c
e
ij(xi,A,x) (16)
25
In our model we dene a network externality as a funtion of the network that aets the utility of an agent.
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where b stands for benet, c for ost, e for externality. The eet of network externalities will
be explained in setion (5.3). Benet, bji(xj, aji), and ost, cij(xi, aij), terms are monotonially
inreasing with the value of knowledge, xi . They have the the following properties
bji(xj, aji) =
{
0 if aji = 0 ∨ xj = 0
> 0 if aji = 1 ∧ xj > 0
(17)
cij(xi, aij) =
{
0 if aij = 0 ∨ xi = 0
> 0 if aij = 1 ∧ xi > 0
(18)
We assume that benets are linear funtions of the value of knowledge of agent i whih shares
its knowledge with agent j. We the linear assumption bji(xj, aji) = ajixj .
In the most simple ase osts for transferring knowledge an be negleted, cij(xi, aij) = 0. This
means that knowledge is fully odied (Foray, 2004) and it an be transferred to another agent
without any losses. Further, null osts imply that knowledge is non-rivalrous, meaning that the
value of knowledge is not redued by the use of that knowledge by another agent. When osts
are negleted, the growth in the value of knowledge of agent i is given by the following equation
(the ase of Null Interation Costs, further analyzed in setion (3.5.1)).
dxi
dt
= −dxi + b
n∑
j=1
ajixj (19)
In more realisti setting, osts annot be negleted. In order to ome up with a reasonable
expression for these osts we make some further assumptions. We assume that the higher the
value of knowledge of an agent is, the more omplex it is. Moreover the more omplex knowledge
is, the more diult is it to transfer it (Sorenson et al., 2006; Rivkin, 2000). The oordination
and proessing apabilities of agents are onstrained (managerial breakdown). Thus, the more
omplex knowledge gets the higher are the osts for transferring it. The ost, cij(xi, aij), for
transferring knowledge from agent i to agent j is an inreasing funtion of the value of the
knowledge that is to be transferred, xi. We assume that osts inrease by more than a proportional
hange in the value of knowledge that is being transferred.
cij(αxi) > αcij(xi) (20)
This harateristi is losely related to dereasing returns to sale and onvex ost funtions
26
.
The most simple setting for suh a funtion is a quadrati term of the form cij(xi, aij) = caijx
2
i .
The growth in the value of knowledge of agent i is then governed by the following equation (the
ase of Inreasing Interation Costs, further analyzed in setion (3.5.2)).
dxi
dt
= −dxi + b
n∑
j=1
ajixj − c
n∑
j=1
aijx
2
i (21)
26
In the standard eonomi theory of the agent the extent to whih a given input an inrease output is usually
assumed to be a dereasing funtion of the input. The output inreases at a dereasing rate when the input in
prodution inreases (Hausman, 2003).
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This is an ordinary dierential equation with a linear deay, a linear benet and quadrati osts.
(21) an be interpreted as an extension of a logisti equation. In a omplete graph every agent
shares her knowledge with every other agent. Starting with the same initial values this symmetry
implies, that all knowledge values are idential, i.e. xi = x. (21) then beomes
dx
dt
= −dx+ b(n− 1)x− c(n − 1)x2
d
b
≪n−−−→ b(n− 1)x (1− c
b
x
) (22)
(22) is similar to the logisti funtion x˙ = αx(1− x
β
) with parameters α = b(n− 1) and β = b/c.
In the following setion we relate the topology (yli topologies in partiular) of the network
with the long-run values of knowledge of the agents.
3.4 Non-Permanene of Direted Ayli Graphs
The study of the relation between the performane of an eonomy and the underlying network of
interations has already a long tradition, see e.g. Rosenblatt (1957) (yli nets). More reently
Maxeld (1994) has shown that the existene of a ompetitive equilibrium is related to the strong
onnetedness of the network of relations between users and produers in a market eonomy.
Strong onnetedness means that there exists a losed walk or a yle in the network. On the
other hand, if there does not exist suh a yle, then the network is not strongly onneted. In
a similar way in our model strong onnetedness is ritially inuening the performane of the
agents. In the main result of this setion (14) we show that in our model all values of knowledge
vanish if the underlying network of interations does not ontain a yle.
For the general equation (13) we an identify the topology of the network in whih agents annot
be permanent. Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) give the following denition of permanene:
Denition 6 A dynamial system is said to be permanent if there exists a δ > 0 suh that
xi(0) > 0 for i = 1, ..., n implies limt→∞ inf xi(t) > δ.
First, we have to introdue the denition of graphs whih do no ontain any losed walks or
yles.
Denition A direted ayli graph is a direted graph with no direted yles.
More general, if a graph is a direted ayli graph then it does not ontain a losed walk.
For several proofs in this setion we need the following lemma (denoted by the omparison
priniple (Khalil, 1995)).
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Lemma 7 If we onsider two time-dependent variables, x(t) and y(t) with dierent growth fun-
tions g(x) and f(x) (ontinuous, dierentiable)
x˙ = f(x) (23)
y˙ = g(x) (24)
x(0) = y(0) (25)
and g(x) ≥ f(x) then it follows that y(t) ≥ x(t). Similarly if g(x) ≤ f(x) then y(t) ≤ x(t).
Proof. Using Cauhy's mean value theorem for the two ontinuous, dierentiable funtions,
x(t) and y(t), we have
x′(τ)
y′(τ)
=
x(t)− x0
y(t)− y0 ≥ 1 (26)
with τ ∈ (0, t). The inequality holds sine x′(τ) = f(x(τ)) ≥ y′(τ) = g(y(τ)) ∀τ ∈ (0, t). It
follows that
x(t)− x0 ≥ y(t)− y0 (27)
x0 = y0 (28)
and thus x(t) ≥ y(t). ✷
If a network is a direted ayli graph then it does not ontain a losed walk. For a direted
ayli graph we an make the following observation
Proposition 8 In every direted ayli graph, there is at least one node v with no inoming
links, i.e. a soure.
Proof. (Godsil and Royle, 2001) We give a proof by ontradition. We assume that every node
has an inoming link. We start with some node u and nd an inoming link (x, u) - by assumption
every node has at least one inoming link. We go to the destination of the link, x. Again we an
nd an inoming link (y, x). We then proeed to node y. There is an inoming link (z, y). We
onsider node z. After at most n+ 1 steps, we will visit some node in the graph twie. This is a
ontradition to the assumption that the graph is ayli. ✷
We an partition the nodes in the network into spei sets whih take into aount from whih
other nodes there exists an inoming path to these nodes. We will show that this is important
to obtain a result on the permanene of the values of knowledge of the agents.
Denition 9 We denote the set of soures of a direted ayli graph G by S0. We say that S0
is the 0-th order soures of G. The nodes that have only inoming links from S0 are denoted by
S1, the 1-st order soures of G. We onsider the graph G\S0. The nodes that have only inoming
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links from S1 in G\S0 (obtained by removing the nodes in S0 and their inident links from G)
are denoted by S2. Aordingly, the nodes having only inoming links from Sk−1 in the graph
G\(Sk−2 ∪ ... ∪ S0) are denoted by Sk, the k-th order soures of G, where k ≤ n.
We an have at most n suh sets in the graph G with n nodes. In this ase G is a direted path
Pk. Moreover we have that
Proposition 10 The nodes in a direted ayli graph G an be partitioned in the sets
S0, S1, ..., Sk, k ≤ n dened in (9).
Proof. From proposition (8) we know that the direted ayli graph G has at least one soure
node. All the soures form the set S0. If we remove the nodes in S0 (as well as their inident
links) from G then we obtain again a direted ayli graph G1 := G\S0 (sine the removal of
links annot reate yles). Therefore proposition (8) also holds for G1. We onsider the soure
nodes in G1. These nodes have not been soures in G and they have beome soures by removing
the inident links of the soures in G. Thus, the soure nodes in G1 have only inoming links
from nodes in S0. Further on, the soures in G1 form the set S1. We an now remove the nodes
S1 from G1 and obtain the graph G2 with new soures S2. We an onsider the k − th removal
of soure nodes. We make the indution hypothesis that the soures of Gk−1 form the set Sk−1.
Removing the soures from Gk−1 gives a direted ayli graph Gk whih ontains the soures
Sk. One an ontinue this proedure until all nodes have been put into sets S0, S1, ..., Sk with at
most k = n sets. ✷
There exists a relationship between the set (dened in (9)) a node belongs to and the nodes from
whih there exists an inoming path to that node.
Corollary 11 Consider a node i ∈ Sj. Then there does not exist a path from nodes k ∈ Sm,
m ≥ j, to node i. Conversely node i has only inoming path from nodes in the sets S0, ..., Sj−1.
Proof. Assume for ontradition that there exists suh a path from a node k ∈ Sm, m ≥ j to a
node i ∈ Sj . By the onstrution of the sets Sj (9) node i must be a soure with no inoming links
after the removal of the sets S0, ..., Sj−1 from G. But this is a ontradition to the assumption
that node j has an inoming link from a node k ∈ Sm, m ≥ j. ✷
From the above denition and observations we an derive an upper bound on the values of
knowledge of the nodes in a direted ayli graph.
Proposition 12 Consider (13) with a linear deay Di(xi) = dxi, a linear benet Bi(A(G),x) =
b
∑
j∈N−i
xj and a non-negative ost Ci(A(G),x) ≥ 0 where d ≥ 0, b ≥ 0. Then for every node i
in G there exists a k ≤ n suh that
xi(t) ≤ (aktk + ak−1tk−1 + ...+ a0)e−dt (29)
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Proof. From proposition (10) we know the the direted ayli graph G has a partition of nodes
into soures S0, ..., Sk, k ≤ n. Consider a node x0 ∈ S0. With (13) the time evolution of her value
of knowledge is given by
x˙0 = −dx0 − C0 ≤ −dx0 (30)
Here we use the fat that C0 ≥ 0. The funtion solving the equation x˙ = −dx is an upper bound
for x0(t) (with idential initial onditions), see (7). From proposition (11) we know that there
are rst-order soures S1 in G that have only inoming links from nodes in S0. The evolution of
the value of knowledge for a node x1 ∈ S1 is given by
x˙1 = −dx1 +
∑
j∈S0
xj − C1 (31)
The seond term on the right hand side of the above equation ontains the sum of all values of
knowledge of all nodes in S0. We know that they are bounded from above by x(t) ≤ x(0)e−dt.
Thus, (31) has an upper bound
x˙1 ≤ −dx1 + a1e−dt (32)
with an appropriate onstant a1. The solution of the equation x˙ = −dx + a1e−dt is given by
x(t) = (a1 + a0t)e
−dt
. It follows that
x1 ≤ (a1 + a0t)e−dt (33)
In the following we make a strong indution. We have the indution hypothesis that for the
(k − 1)-th order soures there exists an upper bound
x˙k−1 ≤ (ak−1tk−1 + ak−2tk−2 + ...+ a0)e−dt (34)
and this holds also for all nodes in the sets of soures with order less than k − 1. We onsider
the nodes in Sk with l ∈ Sk. We have that
x˙l(t) = −dxl + b
∑
j∈N−
l
xj − Cl (35)
where the in-neighborhood N−l ontains only nodes in the sets S0, ..., Sk−1. For these nodes an
upper bound is given by (34) and thus we get an upper bound for (35)
x˙l(t) ≤ −dxl + (ak−1tk−1 + ak−2tk−2 + ...+ a0)e−dt (36)
We an now use the following lemma
Lemma 13 For an ordinary dierential equation of the form
y˙ + dy = (akt
k + ak−1t
k−1 + ...+ a2t+ a1)e
−dt
(37)
there exists a solution of the form
y(t) =
(
ak
k + 1
tk+1 + ...+ a0
)
e−dt (38)
with the limit limt→∞ y(t) = 0
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Solving for the upper bound from above gives the desired result.
xl(t) ≤ (aktk + ak−1tk−1 + ...+ a0)e−dt (39)
✷
With the last proposition (12) it is straightforward to obtain the following orollary, whih is the
main result of this setion.
Corollary 14 Consider (13) with a linear deay Di(xi) = dxi, a linear benet Bi(A(G),x) =
b
∑
j∈N−i
xj and a non-negative ost Ci(A(G),x) ≥ 0 where d ≥ 0, b ≥ 0. If the network G is a
direted ayli graph then the values of knowledge vanish. This means that G is not permanent.
Proof. From proposition (12) we know that eah node k in the graph G has a value of knowledge
whih is bounded by xk(t) ≤ (aktk + ak−1tk−1 + ... + a0)e−dt for some nite k ≤ n. Sine any
nite polynomial grows less than an exponential funtion we have that limt→∞ xk(t) = 0. This
holds for all nodes in G. This ompletes the proof that for all i = 1, ..., n in a direted ayli
graph G we have that limt→∞ xi(t) = 0 and therefore G is not permanent. ✷
Thus, if agents are permanent, the graph ontains a losed walk (or a yle). If agents get
their links attahed at random, only those survive, who are part of a yle. If agents an hose,
whom to transfer their knowledge to, then they have to form yles, in order to survive. Others
(Bala and Goyal, 2000; Kim and Wong, 2007) have found similar results in whih the equilibrium
network onsists of yles.
There exist a onvenient way to identify if a network ontains a yle without atually looking at
the permanene of the network whih would require to ompute the long-run values of knowledge
(usually by numerial integration). Instead, from the eigenvalues of the adjaeny matrix, A(G),
of a graph, G, one an determine if G ontains a yle. The Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue of a
graph G, denoted by λ
PF
(G), is the largest real eigenvalue of A(G). The following properties
hold (Godsil and Royle, 2001)
Proposition 15 If a graph G
1. has no losed walk, then λ
PF
(G) = 0,
2. has a losed walk, then λ
PF
(G) > 1.
Thus, if the graph ontains permanent agents, then λ
PF
(G) > 1. Stadler and Shuster (1996);
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) have found similar onditions under whih populations are per-
manent in a network of repliators
27
.
27
The repliator equation (in ontinuous form) is given by: x˙i = xi (fi(x)− φ(x)) where φ(x) =
P
i
xifi(x) and
fi(x) is the tness of speies i.
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Finally, we an ompute the probability of a network to ontain a yle if links were attahed at
random.
Proposition 16 The probability of a random graph G(n, p) with n nodes ontaining a yle is
given by (Jain and Krishna, 2002)
P =
(
1− (1− p)n−1)n (40)
whih is 0 if p = 0 and 1 if p = 1.
Proof. We an ompute the probability of having a losed walk in a random graph G(n, p).
Eah link is reated with probability p. Thus we have a Bernoulli proess for the adjaeny
matrix elements aij (whih indiate if an link exists or not).
aij =
{
1 with probability p
0 with probability 1− p
(41)
For every node we have n − 1 events to reate an link and we are asking for the probability of
having at least one of them being reated (every node should have at least one inoming link).
This is a binomial umulative funtion of the form (Durrett, 2004; Casella and Berger, 2001)
P =
n−1∑
k=1
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k (42)
whih is equivalent to eq. (40), if we use the Binomial theorem
(x+ y)n =
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
xiyn−i (43)
✷
A similar result to (14) has been found by Kim and Wong (2007). The authors study a gen-
eralized version of the network formation model introdued by Bala and Goyal (2000)
28
. The
equilibrium networks in their model are so alled minimal graphs whih are graphs that max-
imize the number of agents that are onneted while maintaining only as few links as possible.
It is intuitively lear, that the most sparse onneted graph is a yle. Thus, the authors nd
stable equilibrium networks that onsist of yles. However, in setion 5.2 we will show that the
network evolution an redue the set of possible yles in the equilibrium network suh that only
the smallest yles survive.
Thus, yles play an important role in the evolution of the network and the ability of agents to
have non-vanishing knowledge levels. Before we dene the evolution of the network in setion (4)
we study the dynamis of the values of knowledge for a stati network in the next setion (3.5).
There we will further speify the ost funtions under investigation: null osts and nonlinear
osts for maintaining links.
28
For a further study of Bala and Goyal (2000) applied to information networks see Haller and Sarangi (2005);
Haller et al. (2007).
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3.5 Stati Network Analysis
In the following we analyze the growth funtions for the value of knowledge and study two ases
separately. In the rst, osts are set to zero while in the seond osts are a quadrati funtion of
the values of knowledge of the agents.
3.5.1 Null Interation Costs
The most simple ase of our general framework is the one of linear benet and null osts
29
.
dxi
dt
= −dxi +
n∑
i=1
ajixj (44)
In vetor notation (44) reads:
x˙ = (AT − dI)x (45)
where AT is the transposed of the adjaeny matrix and I is the identity matrix. The solution
of the set of equations (45) depends on the properties of the matrix A and has the general form
(matrix exponential):
x(t) = e−dteA
T tx(0) (46)
representing an exponential inrease in time of the vetor of knowledge values. The relative values
of knowledge (shares) are given by
yi =
xi∑
j xj
;
∑
j
yj = 1 (47)
Rewriting (44) by means of (47) gives us the dynamis of the shares:
y˙i =
n∑
j
ajiyj − yi
n∑
k,j
ajkyj (48)
(48) has the property of preserving the normalization of y. Note that the deay term does not
appear in this equation for the relative values. It an be shown (Horn and Johnson, 1990; Boyd,
2006; Krishna, 2003) that the eigenvetor to the largest real eigenvalue of AT (A respetively)
29
This model has been studied by Jain and Krishna (1998b); Krishna (2003) to explain the origin of life from
the perspetive of interating agents. The model of Jain and Krishna intends to desribe the atalyti proesses
in a network of moleular speies (whih we will denote in the following by agents). However, it was very soon
suggested to be appliable to an eonomi innovation ontext of interating agents. In the next setions we will
present a more general framework enompassing some of the limitation of the present one. In their model the
x were interpreted as onentrations of hemial speies. The aij are the kineti oeients that desribe the
repliation of agents i resulting from binary interations with other agents j.
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is the stable xed point of (48)
30
. If we onsider an eigenvetor y(λ) assoiated with the largest
real eigenvalue λ of matrix AT (idential to the largest real eigenvalue of A) we have
n∑
j=1
ajiy
(λ)
j = λy
(λ)
i (49)
Inserting y(λ) into (48) yields
y˙
(λ)
i =
n∑
j
ajiy
(λ)
j − y(λ)i
n∑
k,j=1
ajky
(λ)
j (50)
= λy
(λ)
i − y(λ)i
n∑
k,j=1
ajky
(λ)
j︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ
Pn
k y
(λ)
k
=λ
(51)
= λy
(λ)
i − λy(λ)i = 0 (52)
Thus, y
(λ)
i is a stationary solution of (48). For the proof of stability see e.g. Krishna (2003).
3.5.2 Inreasing Interation Costs
In the following we study the evolution of the values of knowledge under a given network struture
and we try to ompute the xed points where ever possible. We rst show that the values of
knowledge are non-negative and bounded. For graphs with 2 nodes, for regular graphs (inluding
the omplete graph), yles and stars with an arbitrary number of nodes, we an ompute the
equililibrium points analytially. For generi graphs with n ≥ 3 nodes we have to rely on numerial
integrations.
The nonlinear (quadrati) dynamial system is given by
x˙i = −dxi + b
n∑
j=1
ajixj − c
n∑
j=1
aijx
2
i (53)
with initial onditions, xi(0) > 0. aij are the elements of the adjaeny matrix, A, of a graph G.
This an be written as
x˙i = −dxi + b
n∑
j=1
ajixj − cd+i x2i (54)
where d+i =
∑n
j=1 aij is the outdegree of node i. In the ase of inreasing osts we know that the
values of knowledge are bounded. We have that
30
If the largest real eigenvalue has multipliity more than one then the stable xed point an be written as a
linear ombination of the assoiated eigenvetor and generalized eigenvetors (Braun, 1993).
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Proposition 17 For the dynamial system (53) the values of knowledge are non-negative and
nite, i.e. 0 ≤ xi <∞, i = 1, ..., n.
Proof. For the lower bound xi ≥ 0 we observe that
x˙i ≥ −dxi − c(n− 1)x2i (55)
The lower bound is the solution of the equation x˙ = −dx − c(n − 1)x2. The solution of this
equation an be found by solving the orresponding equation for the transformed variable z = 1
x
.
We get x(t) = de
da
edt−c(n−1)eda
with an appropriate onstant a = 1
d
ln x(0)
d+(n−1)c . Starting from non-
negative initial values x(0) ≥ 0 this lower bound is non-negative as well and approahes null for
large t, i.e. limt→∞ x(t) = 0. We onlude that xi(t) ≥ 0.
In order to ompute an upper bound, xi ≤ onst.< ∞ we rst make the following observation.
The nodes of a graph, G = (V,E), an be partitioned in nodes without outgoing links, Vf ⊆ V
(free-riders), and nodes with at least one outgoing link, Vs ⊆ V (soures).
Sine the free-riders in Vf have no outgoing links, the benet terms of the soures in Vs are
independent of the values of knowledge of the free-riders. Aordingly a soure node i ∈ Vs has
the following knowledge dynamis.
x˙i = −dxi + b
∑
j∈Vs\i
ajixj − cx2i d+i (56)
where d+i is the out-degree of node i. We an give an upper bound of
x˙i ≤ −dxi + b
∑
j∈Vs
xj − cx2i (57)
This upper bound has a (nite) xed point and so does xi(t). The xed point is given by
dxi + cx
2
i = b
∑
j∈Vs
xj (58)
This is a symmetri equation and therefore all xi are idential, xi = x. For ontradition assume
that there would be xi 6= xj . Then we have that
dxi + cx
2
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
Pn
k=1 xk
6= dxj + cx2j︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
Pn
k=1 xk
(59)
But the left and right side of the equation are idential and so two dierent xi, xj annot exist.
When all solutions are idential we get xi = x =
bn−d
c
∀i. Thus, we have shown that there exists
an upper bound with a nite xed point for the soure nodes, that is xi(t) ≤ ∞, i ∈ Vs.
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We now onsider the nodes with no outgoing links (free-riders). A node i ∈ Vf follows the
dynamis
x˙i = −dxi + b
∑
j∈Vs
ajixj (60)
We have shown already that the soure nodes are bounded by some onstant,
∑
j∈Vs
xj ≤ onst..
Thus we have that
x˙i ≤ −dxi + onst. (61)
We have an upper bound of the xi, i ∈ Vf , given by
xi(t) ≤ x0e−dt + onst.
d
(62)
with limt→∞ xi(t) =
onst.
d
. We have shown that for all nodes (soures Vs as well as free-riders
Vf ) 0 ≤ xi <∞, i ∈ V (G). ✷
For speial types of graphs we an dedue further results on the values of knowledge of the agents.
First, we an ompute the xed points (given by x˙i = 0) for regular graphs.
Proposition 18 For any k−regular graph G the xed point of the values of knowledge is given
by x∗ = kb−d
kc
. In partiular the omplete graph Kn has the highest total value of knowledge among
all regular graphs with x∗ = (n−1)b−d(n−1)c .
Proof. The dynamis of the values of knowledge of the nodes in a regular graph with degree
d+i = d
−
i = k is given by
x˙i = −dxi + b
∑
j∈Ni
xj − ckx2i (63)
Starting with homogeneous initial onditions we make the Ansatz xi = x i = 1, ..., n. We get the
positive stable xed points x∗ = kb−d
kc
. ✷
Seond, we an ompute the xed points for yles.
Proposition 19 For any yle Cn the xed point of the values of knowledge is given by x
∗ = b−d
c
.
Proof. The dynamis of the values of knowledge of a yle Ck of length k is given by
x˙i = −dxi + bxi−1 − ckx2i (64)
Starting with homogeneous onditions we make the Ansatz xi = x i = 1, ..., n. We get the
positive stable xed points x∗ = b−d
c
. ✷
Third, the xed points for a star an be omputed (the proof an be found in the appendix).
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Proposition 20 For a star Kn,n−1 there exists a xed point whih inreases with the number of
nodes. For d = 0 the star has a xed point of x∗ = b
c
.
Proof. The dynamis of the values of knowledge of a star K1,n−1 is given by
x˙1 = +b
n∑
i=2
xi − c(n − 1)x2i (65)
(x˙i)i>1 = −dxi + bx1 − cx2i (66)
where we assume that all links are bidiretional. Starting with homogeneous initial onditions
we make the Ansatz xi = x2 i = 2, ..., n. Then x2 is determined by the root of the polynomial
x32 +
2d
c
x22 +
d(cb+ (n− 1)cd)
(n− 1)c3 x2 +
b(d2 − (n− 1)b2)
(n− 1)c3 = 0 (67)
And x1 =
d
b
x2 +
c
b
x22. For d = 0 we obtain x
∗
1 = x
∗
2 =
b
c
. ✷
The xed point inreases with the benet b and dereases with the deay d and the ost c.
We observe that, for vanishing deay, d = 0, the xed point of the system is idential for the
regular graph, the yle and the star and given by
b
c
. As expeted this xed point is inreasing
with the benet and dereasing with the ost. In a regular graph the xed point is inreasing with
the degree k and the asymptoti value (for large k) is b
c
. Thus, in a regular graph the xed point
ranges for inreasing k from b−d
c
to
b
c
. Similarly, for the star the xed point also inreases with
the number of nodes (i.e. the degree of the entral node) but we an not provide an analytial
expression here. On the other hand, the xed point of the yle is independent of the length of
the yle. This means that there is no inentive for nodes to be part of larger yles. And, as we
will see in the next setion, this limits the growth of the network.
Example 21 We numerially integrate (53) for n = 2 nodes. We set d = 0.5, c = 0.5 and b = 1.
Fixed points are denoted x∗i for i = 1, 2. x
∗
i = 0 is a xed point for all graphs.
(1)
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)
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The xed points are given by
x∗i =
b− d
c
, i = 1, 2, 3 (68)
(2)
1 2
A2 =
(
0 1
0 0
)
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The xed points are given by
x∗i = 0, i = 1, 2, 3 (69)
(3)
1 2
A3 =
(
0 0
0 0
)
0 5 10 15 200
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
 
 
PSfrag replaements
x1
x2
x
i
t
The xed points are given by
x∗i = 0, i = 1, 2, 3 (70)
In general the xed points of (53) an only be omputed numerially. As an example, we ompute
the xed points for all graphs with n = 3 nodes for a spei hoie of parameters. The results
an be found in the appendix in setion (A). In our model we numerially integrate (53) for a
large time T (and we nd that in our simulations the system always reahes a stable xed point).
4 Dynamis of Network Evolution
4.1 Network Evolution as an Iterative Proess
After providing the stati equilibrium analysis, in this setion we turn now to the dynamis of
the network evolution by investigating dierent assumptions for the reation and deletion of
links in the network. In partiular, we ompare two dierent senarios, namely the so-alled
extremal dynamis, where agents do not deide themselves about the link reation and deletion,
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and the utility driven dynamis, where agents make this deision themselves based on dierent
rules disussed below.
We rst dene the utility of the agents in our model for a given network G.
Denition 22 Consider a (stati) network G. The utility of agent i is given by
ui =
{
yi(T ), for Null Interation Costs
xi(T ), for Inreasing Interation Costs
(71)
where the value of knowledge xi(t) is given by (53) and A(G), the relative value of knowledge
yi(t) by (48) and A(G). T is alled the time horizon.
We assume that the aumulation of knowledge is faster than the frequeny of the agents reating
or deleting links
31
. With this assumption, we an introdue a time-sale separation between the
aumulation of knowledge and the evolution of the network.
initialization
xi reah
quasi-equilibrium
perturbation
of aij
Figure 7: Shemati representation of the network evolution as an iterative proess.
The evolution of the system is then dened by an alternating sequene of knowledge aumula-
tion, where we keep the network xed for a given time T , A(G) =onst., and hanges in the links
(asynhronous updating of the nodes) (see Fig. 7). When the knowledge aumulation has reahed
time T , the network struture is hanged. A hange in the network takes plae by either link
addition between two agents i and j, aij = 0 → aij = 1, or by link removal, aij = 1 → aij = 0.
When the network has hanged, the new utility, determined by (22), an be omputed for time
2T . This iterative proedure of knowledge aumulation and link hanges ontinues for 3T, 4T, ...
and so on until the network reahes an equilibrium. One an shematially represent this iteration
by the following algorithm:
1 initialization: Random graph G(n, p).
31
This means that the value of knowledge on the market (whih is not expliitly modeled here) reahes a sta-
tionary state determined by the R&D ollaborations of eah agent (and her neighbors). Only after this adaptation
of the evaluation of the stoks of knowledge is nished, i.e. it has reahed a stationary state, agents asynhronously
hange their links.
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2 quasi-equilibrium: fast knowledge growth/deline
With A xed, agents evolve aording to (13) for a given (large) time T .
3 perturbation: slow network evolution
After time T , the network evolves aording to two alternative seletion proesses:
1. Extremal Dynamis
32
.
The agent with the minimum utility is hosen (if there are more than one agent with
the same minimum value, then one of them is hosen at random). The utility of that
agent is set to its initial value and all its outgoing and ingoing links are replaed with
new random links drawn with probability p from and to all other agents in the system.
2. Utility Driven Dynamis
An agent is randomly hosen to reate or delete one link (unidiretional or bidiretional
link formation mehanisms, see setion 4.3). More speially:
(i) Either a pair or a single agent is randomly hosen to reate or remove a link.
(ii) The eet of this link deision (reation or deletion) is evaluated at time T . The
evaluation an have the following onsequenes on the link deision.
∗ If the utility has inreased, then sustain the link deision.
∗ If the utility has dereased, then undo the link deision.
4 Stop the evolution, if the network is stable (stability is dened in setion (4.3), otherwise
go to 2
4.2 Extremal Dynamis versus Utility Driven Dynamis
Extremal dynamis intends to mimi natural seletion (the extintion of the weakest) and the
introdution of novelty, whih is a global seletion mehanism. In ontrast, utility driven dynamis
is a loal seletion mehanism that mimis the proess by whih selsh agents improve their utility
through a trial and error proess.
The deision upon to add or to remove a link implies a ertain level of information proessing
apabilities (IPC) of the agents. IPC is usually bounded in a omplex environment onsisting of
many other agents and a omplex struture of interations between these agents. In our approah
we assume that the agents have no information on the knowledge values of the other agents and
only limited information on their links (allianes). They only know with whom they interat
diretly (their neighborhood). In table (4.2) we give a short overview of levels of inreasing IPC.
32
See Bak and Sneppen (1993)
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0 Least t addition/removal of links, e.g Jain and Krishna (1998b)
1 Reative (passive) aeptation/refusal of link hanges.
2 Deliberate deision upon to add/remove a link based on a utility funtion
depending on the network, e.g. Ebel and Bornholdt (2002), without onsidering
the possible deision of others.
3 Strategi interation, e.g. Bala and Goyal (2000), onsidering the possible
ations of others.
Table 2: Inreasing levels of information proessing apabilities (IPC) of agents.
Extremal Dynamis refers to a situation in whih agents are exposed to link hanges they annot
inuene and thus to level 0 in table (4.2). Utility Driven Dynamis instead requires a higher
level of IPC than a mere aeptation or refusal of link hanges. But it requires less IPC than an
approah assuming strategi interations of agents. This follows from the fat that in our model,
agents do not estimate how other agents ould reat on their deisions to hange their links. This
situation refers to level 2 in table (4.2). In this hapter we ompare two dierent settings, level
0 and level 2. In the following paragraphs we desribe them in more detail.
0 Extremal Dynamis: At time T the agent with the smallest utility is removed from the
system and replaed with a new one (market entry). The new agent is randomly onneted
to the already existing agents and a small initial value of knowledge is assigned to it. This
proess is a least t replaement (extintion of the weakest) and the new agent introdues
a kind of novelty in the system (innovation).
2 Utility Driven Dynamis: The main dierene between loal link formation (Utility
Driven Dynamis) ompared to global link formation (Extremal Dynamis) is that agents
are now individually taking deisions upon their interations and they do that on the basis
of a utility funtion (their values of knowledge at time T ). Agents are bounded rational
sine they explore their possible interation partners in a trial and error proess.
At every period, that is after time T , an agent is seleted at random to reate and delete
links (asynhronous update). We distinguish two possible link formation mehanisms whih
we study separately, namely unilateral and bilateral link formation. In the former, unilateral
link formation (i), the agent optimally deletes an old link and randomly reates a new link.
Optimal means that either for reation or deletion of links the ation is taken only if it
inreases the value of knowledge of the agent at time T in the range of all possible ations. In
the latter, bilateral formation (ii), the seleted agent optimally deletes a bilateral onnetion
that she urrently has or she randomly reates a new bilateral onnetion. Here optimal
(in the range of all possible ations) means, that links are deleted if the initiator of the
deletion, i.e. the seleted agent, an inrease its value of knowledge at time T with the
deletion of the link, while for the bilateral reation both agents involved have to stritly
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benet from the reation of the mutual onnetion
33
. In the following two setions we give
a desription of mehanisms (i) and (ii).
To ompare the two levels, for Utility Driven Dynamis the evolution of the network follows from
loal, utility driven, ations, as opposed to Extremal Dynamis, where the evolution follows from
a global stohasti proess (least t seletion plus random link formation). To be more spei
about the latter, the rules for the network evolution, i.e. the reation and deletion of links under
Extremal Dynamis, are the following:
Step 1 After a given time T the least t agent, i.e., the one with
the smallest ui = yi(T ), is determined. This agent is re-
moved from the network along with all its inoming and
outgoing links.
Step 2 A new agent is added to the network with some small ini-
tial value of knowledge y0. The new agent will take the
plae of the old one (it gets the same label), and randomly
links itself to the other nodes in the network with the same
probability p. Eah of the other nodes an in turn link
itself to the newomer node with a probability p.
These rules for the network evolution are intended to apture two key features: natural seletion,
in this ase, the extintion of the weakest; and the introdution of novelty. Both of these an be
seen as lying at the heart of natural evolution. The partiular form of seletion used in this model
has been inspired by what Bak and Sneppen have alled extremal dynamis (Bak and Sneppen,
1993).
4.3 Rules for Link Creation and Deletion Using Utility Driven Dynamis
In this setion we introdue the proess of the formation and deletion of links by agents that
maximize a loal utility funtion (depending on the agent and its neighbors). After time T , long
enough suh that the system reahes a quasi-equilibrium in the values of knowledge, an agent is
randomly hosen to reate or delete a link, either unidiretional or bidiretional.
4.3.1 Unilateral Link Formation
If agents unilaterally delete or reate links it is possible that the interations they form reate a
feed bak loop, i.e. a losed yle of knowledge sharing agents, that involves more than 2 agents.
This introdues the onept of indiret reiproity (see setion 3.2). Unilateral formation of links
33
This behavior is individually optimal and thus may also be alled rational.
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1 2
reate
Figure 8: Random unilateral reation.
(we then have a direted network) is neessary for indiret reiproity to emerge, sine, if all
interations were bilateral they would be diret reiproal by denition. We now desribe the
proedure of unilateral link reation and deletion.
1. Random Unilateral Creation
An agent reates a link to another one to whih it is not already onneted at random and
evaluates the reation of the link by omparing the hange in their values of knowledge before
and after the reation. Only if the hange is positive, the link is maintained, otherwise the agent
does not reate the link. In this way agents explore possible partners for sharing their knowledge
in a trial and error proedure.
Step 1 An agent i is seleted at random.
Step 2 Another agent j is seleted at random whih is not already
an out-neighbor of i.
Step 3 Agent i reates an outgoing link to agent j.
Step 4 The new utility (for the old network plus the new link
eij) of agent i is omputed and ompared with the utility
before the reation.
Step 5 Only if agent i's utility stritly inreases ompared to her
old utility, then the link is reated.
2. Optimal Unilateral Deletion
An agent deletes one outgoing link if this inreases her utility.
Step 1 Agent i is seleted at random s.t. it has at least one outgo-
ing link.
Step 2 Agent i deletes separately eah of its outgoing links to its
neighbors vj ∈ N+i and reords the hange in her utility,
∆ui. Before a new link is deleted, the old one is rereated.
Step 3 Agent i omputes the maximum hange ∆ui and if it is
positive, deletes the referring link. This means that only
one link is nally deleted. The deletion only takes plae if
the urrent agent stritly inreases her utility.
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Figure 9: Optimal unilateral deletion.
To haraterize the equilibrium networks under this link formation and deletion mehanism we
introdue the following haraterization of stability
34
.
Denition 23 A network is unilaterally stable if and only if (i) no agent an reate a link to
(stritly) inrease her utility and (ii) no agent an remove a link to (stritly) inrease her utility.
4.3.2 Bilateral Link Formation
If agents form links bilaterally then all interations are diret reiproal by denition. We desribe
the proess of bilateral link reation and deletion in the following paragraphs.
1. Random Bilateral Creation
In this link reation proess a pair of agents is seleted at random and given the possibility to
form a bilateral onnetion.
Step 1 Two agents are uniformly seleted at random suh that
they are not onneted already.
Step 2 Both agents reate an outgoing link to eah other and
therewith reate a 2-yle.
Step 3 The new utilities (for the old network plus the new 2-yle)
of both agents are omputed and ompared with the utili-
ties before the reation.
Step 4 Only if both agents stritly benet in terms of their util-
ities ompared to their old utilities, then the bilateral
onnetion is reated.
2. Optimal Bilateral Deletion
An agent deletes one of its outgoing links to another agent from whih the agent also has an
inoming link if this deletion inreases her utility.
34
Compare this to the denition of bilateral stability (24).
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Figure 10: Random bilateral Creation.
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Figure 11: Optimal bilateral deletion.
Step 1 Agent i is seleted at random suh that it has at least one
mutual link to another agent.
Step 2 From all bilaterally onneted neighbors agent i deletes
separately eah of its outgoing links to its neighbors (and
so does eah neighbor j to agent i). For eah, the hange in
the utility, ∆ui is reorded. Before a new links are deleted,
the old ones are rereated.
Step 3 Agent i omputes the maximum hange ∆ui and, if it is
positive, the referring bilateral onnetion is deleted. The
deletion only takes plae if agent i stritly inreases her
utility.
In order to haraterize the equilibrium outomes of our simulations we will introdue a hara-
terization of network stability. This denition has been introdued by Jakson (2003)
Denition 24 A network G is pairwise stable if (i) removing any link does not inrease the
utility of any agent and (ii) adding a link between any two agents, either doesn't inrease the
utility of any of the two agents, or if it does inrease one of the two agents' utility then it
dereases the other agent's utility.
4.4 The Role of the Time Horizon for Unilateral Link Formation
So far we have assumed that the time horizon T (after whih agents evaluate their deisions
to reate or delete links) is long enough suh that the values of knowledge reah a stationary
state and the utilities of the agents are given by the xed points of the values of knowledge. In
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this setion we disuss the eet of a time horizon that is smaller than the time to onvergene
to the stationary state of the values of knowledge. For related works that inorporate a nite
time horizon in the evaluation of the ations of agents see e.g. Huberman and Glane (1994) or
Lane and Maxeld (1997).
If we onsider Utility Driven Dynamis, we will show that permanent networks with positive
values of knowledge emerge if agents wait long enough in evaluating their deisions. This is a
neessary ondition. Otherwise networks are not able to emerge or, if a network with positive
knowledge values is existing already, it gets destroyed over time (network breakdown). This eet
is important in the ase of null as well as inreasing osts.
To illustrate this point, we onsider a 5-yle of agents and the deletion of one link in this yle
whih reates a linear hain of 5 nodes, Fig. (12). The evolution of value of knowledge for null
osts and for osts c = 0.5 an be seen in Fig. (13).
1
2
3
4
5 →
1
2
3
4
5
Figure 12: A 5-yle and a linear hain of 5 nodes (obtained from the yle be removing one
link).
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Figure 13: Numerial integration of the value of knowledge for d = 0.5, b = 1.0, null ost
c = 0.0 (left) and ost c = 0.5 (right): evolution of knowledge values for a linear hain of 5
nodes (obtained from the C5 by removing an link). The agent that removes the link (blak up-
per urve) initially experienes an inrease in the value of knowledge. After an initial inrease
she experienes a deline and at a ertain time her value of knowledge reahes her initial value
(
1
n
in the ase of null ost and
b−d
c
in the ase of inreasing ost) and then it further dereases.
After a time long enough her value of knowledge vanishes ompletely.
More formally we an give the following proposition.
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Proposition 25 Consider the dynamial system (21). For a direted path Pk of length k the value
of knowledge of node k is larger than ǫ for t ≤ τ(ǫ), i.e. xk(t ≤ τ(ǫ)) ≥ ǫ while limt→∞ xk(t) = 0.
Proof. Consider a direted path Pk of length k.
1 2 k − 1 k· · ·
Figure 14: A direted path Pk of length k.
For node 1 (the soure has no inoming links) in (21) we get
x˙1(t) = −dx1 − cx21 (72)
By introduing the variable z = 1
x1
and solving for z one an nd the solution for x1
x1(t) =
deda
edt − ceda (73)
with a onstant a = 1
d
ln x1(0)
d+c and the limit limt→∞ x1(t) = 0. Aordingly for the k-th node we
have that
x˙k = −dxk + bxk−1 − cx2k (74)
Sine xk ≥ 0, from proposition (17), the following inequality holds
x˙k ≥ −dxk − cx2k (75)
and
xk(t) ≥ de
da′
edt − ceda′ (76)
with a proper onstant a′ = 1
d
ln xk(0)
d+c . Equating with ǫ(t) at t = τ we get
ǫ =
d
edt−da
′ − c (77)
whih yields
τ(ǫ) =
ln
(
d
ǫ
+ c
)
+ a′d
d
(78)
Thus we have found an ǫ(τ) suh that for t ≤ τ(ǫ) xk(t) ≥ ǫ. The limit limt→∞ xk(t) = 0 follows
diretly from the fat that the direted path Pk is a direted ayli graph and we an apply
proposition (14). ✷
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With proposition (25) one an readily infer the following. If an agent in a yle Ck of length
k removes a link unilaterally then a path Pk is reated. If the time horizon after whih the
agent evaluates this link removal is smaller then τ(ǫ)) the agent's value of knowledge satises
xk(t ≤ τ(ǫ)) ≥ ǫ (this gives the utility of the agent, see (22)). From proposition (19) we know
that the value of knowledge of the agent in the yle is given by xk(0) =
b−d
c
. Choosing τ(ǫ) suh
that ǫ > b−d
c
gives xk(t ≤ τ(ǫ)) ≥ xk(0) and the agent experienes an inrease in her utility by
removing the link. The agent removes the link in order to inrease her utility. This destroys the
yle. The time horizon of the agent in this ase is too short in order to antiipate the vanishing
long-run values of knowledge of all the agents in the resulting path, limt→∞ x(t) = 0.
From this observation we onlude that if the time horizon is too short, then all yles would get
destroyed and no network would ever be able to emerge nor sustain, sine only yli networks
an be permanent. The free-riding behavior of agents leads to the breakdown of the eonomy.
4.5 Simple Equilibrium Networks for Unilateral Link Formation
In this setion we identify the most simple equilibrium networks for Unilateral Link Forma-
tion. There exists a multitude of other equilibrium networks whih usually annot be omputed
analytially and whih depend on the parameter values for deay, benet and ost.
The most simple equilibrium network is the empty network.
Proposition 26 The empty graph is unilaterally stable.
Proof. In an empty graph all nodes have vanishing values of knowledge. Creating a link does
not reate a yle (whih would be the ase however if links were formed bilaterally) and thus
the empty graph plus a link is a direted ayli graph with vanishing values of knowledge, see
proposition (14). The reation of a link does not inrease the utility of an agent. Thus, the agents
do not form any links. ✷
Moreover, if all agents form disonneted yles then we have an equilibrium network.
Proposition 27 The set of disonneted yles {C1, ..., Ck}, and possibly isolated nodes is uni-
laterally stable.
Proof. We give a proof for two-yles. The proof an easily be extended to yles of any length.
Consider the two yles C12 and C
2
2 in Fig. (15).
From proposition (19) we know that the xed points are given by xi =
b−d
c
, i = 1, ..., 4. In order
to show that we have a unilaterally stable equilibrium we (i) rst show that no link is reated
and in the following (ii) that no link is deleted.
51/84
Mihael D. König, Stefano Battiston, Frank Shweitzer: Modeling Evolving Innovation Networks
In: Innovation Networks - New Approahes in Modeling and Analyzing (Eds. A. Pyka, A. Sharnhorst)
Heidelberg: Springer, 2008
1
2
3
4
(ii)
(i)
Figure 15: Two yles C12 and C
2
2 and the ases of link reation (i) and deletion (ii).
(i) If a link is reated (w.l.o.g.) from node 2 to 4 we get from (21)
x˙1 = −dx1 + bx2 − cx21 != 0
x˙2 = −dx1 + bx1 − cx22 != 0
(79)
From the rst order onditions for the xed points we get for node 1
x1 =
bx2 − c
d
(80)
And inserting this into the xed point of node 2 gives
x2 =
b2 − d2 +√b4 − 8bc3d− 2b2d2 + d4
4cd
(81)
If the last inequality is fullled, then the reation of the link would derease the utility of
agent 2. The inequality holds if c3 ≥ (d−b)3
b
whih is ertainly true for b > d and c > 0.
Thus, no link is reated between the yles.
(ii) If an link is deleted in a C2 then the we get vanishing steady state values of knowledge.
Sine
b−d
c
≥ 0 this would redue the utility of the agent. Therefore the link is not removed.
If there are k ≤ ⌊n2 ⌋ 2-yles in G the the above argument holds for any pair of yles. Similarly
no isolated node an reate a link in order to inrease her utility nor an a node in a yle reate
a link to an isolated node. Neither link reation nor removal inreases the utility of the initiating
agent and so the set of two-yles is unilaterally stable. ✷
We further onjeture that a set of disonneted autoatalyti sets, where an autoatalyti set is
dened as a set of nodes eah having an inoming link from a node of that set (Jain and Krishna,
2001), stays disonneted under unilateral link formation. Thus, the size (in terms of nodes) is
stable.
With (27) we know that a yle is unilaterally stable. In setion (4.4) however we have shown
that this result is ritially depending on the time horizon T after whih the ation of an agent
is evaluated (and it is true for yles of any length only if T →∞).
52/84
Mihael D. König, Stefano Battiston, Frank Shweitzer: Modeling Evolving Innovation Networks
In: Innovation Networks - New Approahes in Modeling and Analyzing (Eds. A. Pyka, A. Sharnhorst)
Heidelberg: Springer, 2008
For parameters values d = 0.5, b = 0.5 and c = 0.1 also the omplete graph with three nodes
K3 and the path P3 is unilateral stable. We observe this in simulations in Fig. (22). However, by
omputing the xed points numerially for d = 0.5, b = 0.5 and c = 0.1 in setion (A) one an
see that K3 is no longer unilaterally stable (beause removing a link inreases the utility of an
agent).
In the next setion we investigate if the dynami proesses of link formation and deletion lead
to the simple equilibrium strutures suggested above (and indeed we show that they are not
obtained).
5 Simulation Studies Using Dierent Growth Funtions
In the remainder of this hapter, we study simulations with dierent growth funtions (for the
value of knowledge) and dierent link formation mehanisms. We assume that the time horizon T
is long enough suh that the values of knowledge reah their stationary state. The dynamis of the
value of knowledge is given by (19) with null osts or by (21) with inreasing osts. The dierent
link formation mehanisms are desribed in setion (4.2). We ompare the equilibrium networks
obtained from dierent osts and link formation rules in terms of their struture and performane.
Finally, we study the eet of dierent positive network externalities on the equilibrium networks.
Table (3) gives an overview of the simulations that we study in the following. We set d = 0.5,
b = 0.5 and c = 0.1. The omplete set of parameter values used throughout this setion an be
found in table (5) in the appendix.
5.1 Null Interation Costs
In the following we briey disuss the evolution of the network with least t link formation
and null link osts. This model has been studied in detail by Seufert and Shweitzer (2007);
Jain and Krishna (2000). Later Saurabh and Cowan (2004) have applied it to an innovation
model where new ideas are reated and destroyed in a network of ideas.
In this model agents do not have to pay osts for maintaining interations. Aordingly, the
dynamis on the values of knowledge is given by (19)
dxi
dt
= −dxi + b
n∑
j=1
ajixj
and the dynamis in the shares of the values of knowledge yi = xi/
∑n
j=1 xj is given by (48).
y˙i =
n∑
j
ajiyj − yi
n∑
k,j
ajkyj
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Knowledge dynamis Network dynamis Setion
Null osts, cij = 0: least t replaement (5.1)
dxi
dt
= −dxi + b
∑n
j=1 ajixj
Quadrati ost, cij ∝ x2i : least t replaement (5.2)
unilateral link formation
dxi
dt
= −dxi + b
∑n
j=1 ajixj − c
∑n
j=1 aijx
2
i bilateral link formation
Quadrati ost, cij ∝ x2i , and unilateral link formation (5.3)
externality, wji:
dxi
dt
= −dxi +
∑n
j=1(baji + bewji)xj − c
∑n
j=1 aijx
2
i
Table 3: Overview of the simulation studies in this setion with dierent knowledge growth
funtions and dierent link formation mehanisms.
The utility is given by ui = yi(T ). We have desribed in setion (3.5.1) that the xed point
(stationary solution) of the relative values of knowledge in (48) exists and is given by the eigen-
vetor to the largest real eigenvalue of the adjaeny matrix. We assume that the time horizon T
(after whih links get reated or deleted) is large enough suh that the system has reahed this
stationary state before links are hanged.
5.1.1 Extremal Dynamis: least t replaement
After time T the worst performing agent (in terms of her share of value of knowledge yi(T ))
is replaed with a new one. We have desribed this global link formation mehanism in setion
(4.2). Seufert and Shweitzer (2007); Jain and Krishna (2000, 1998a) have extensively studied
the behavior of the dynamis on y and the network G represented by A(G). They show that
strongly onneted sets of nodes with free-riders (that are reeiving knowledge from the strong
omponent but are not ontributing knowledge bak to the strong omponent) attahed
35
appear
and get destroyed in a proess of repeatedly removing the worst performing node (with minimum
yi) and replaing it with a new one.
In omputer simulations we an reprodue the results of Seufert and Shweitzer (2007);
Jain and Krishna (2000). We observe rashes and reoveries in the average utility and degrees
of the agents over time as an be seen in Fig. (16). Thus, no stable equilibrium network an be
realized with this type of network dynamis.
35
Jain and Krishna (2001) denote this set of nodes the autoatalyti set (ACS): it is a subgraph of nodes in
whih every node has at least one inoming link from that subgraph.
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Figure 16: Least Fit replaement: (a) Average utility. (b) Average degree. () Initial random
graph. (d) Graph after 5000 iterations.
In the model of Jain and Krishna (2000) links are ostless. In the next setion (5.2) we assume
that links have a ost attahed that is an inreasing funtion of the value of knowledge that is
being transfered (setion (5.2)).
Moreover, The least t network dynamis treats agents as ompletely passive units that are
exposed to an external seletion mehanism. In a more realisti approah one should take into
aount that agents are deliberately deiding upon with whom to engage in an R&D ollaboration
or to share their knowledge with. These deisions are taken on the basis of inreasing a utility
funtion, that is their value of knowledge
36
. We introdue loal link formation rules in setion
(4.3). Moreover, as a further extension we study the eet of positive network externalities in
setion (5.3).
36
A model in whih the eigenvetor assoiated with the largest real eigenvalue is used as a utility funtion is
studied in Ballester et al. (2006).
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5.2 Inreasing Interation Costs
In this setion we study the eet of inreasing osts for maintaining interations with other
agents on the resulting equilibrium networks. The evolution of the value of knowledge is given
by 53 and the utility of the agents by (22). The ost of a link depends quadratially on the value
of knowledge of the agent that initiates the interation. We study three dierent link formation
mehanisms. The rst is a least t replaement. We will ompare the results of the simulation
with the preeding setion where links were ostless. In the following two setions link formation
mehanisms are studied in whih agents deide loally upon to reate or delete links either
unilaterally or bilaterally based on their utility (22). We assume that the time horizon is long
enough suh that the utility of the agents is given by the xed points of the value of knowledge.
We will show that least t replaement of agents leads to a total network breakdown eventually
from whih the system annot reover. Moreover, we show that bilateral link formation leads to
a omplete graph while with unilateral link formation this is not the ase. For unilateral link
formation only a small number of agents have non-vanishing knowledge values in the resulting
equilibrium network and these luster together in bilateral onnetions. Depending on the link
formation mehanism and the parameter values (for deay, benet and ost) the equilibrium
networks an vary onsiderably.
The evolution of the value of knowledge of agent i (53)
dxi
dt
= −dxi + b
n∑
i=1
ajixj − c
n∑
i=1
aijx
2
i
and her utility is given by ui = xi(T ).
5.2.1 Extremal Dynamis: least t replaement
Similarly to the preeding setion links are formed and removed by a least-t seletion mehanism
(introdued in setion (4.2)). The agent with the smallest utility (22) is replaed with a new agent.
But in this setion osts for maintaining links are an inreasing funtion of the knowledge value
of the transmitting agent.
In this setting, it is possible that the system breaks down ompletely. A simulation run exhibiting
suh a rash an be seen in Fig. (17). If the network is sparse enough the link removal mehanism
an destroy the yles in the network and thus reates a direted ayli graph. As soon as the
network evolution hits a direted ayli graph all value of knowledge vanish (and aordingly
the utilities of the agents) and the network entirely breaks down.
We do not experiene a breakdown of the network in the ase of null osts in the last setion sine
there we were onsidering relative values of knowledge only. The normalization of the relative
values,
∑n
i=1 yi = 1 prevents all the shares to beome 0 at the same time, yi = 0 ∀i. Thus we do
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not get a total breakdown of the network in whih all values of knowledge vanish. Instead, there
the system an always reover from a rash of the network.
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Figure 17: Extremal Dynamis: (a) Average utility. (b) Average degree. () Initial random
graph. (d) Graph after 5000 iterations (in the equilibrium). The network experienes a total
breakdown eventually.
5.2.2 Utility Driven Dynamis: bilateral link formation
In this setion agents are reating or deleting links bilaterally. All interations are therefore diret
reiproal. In simulations we observe the following eet. Bilateral reation and deletion results
in a omplete subgraph (The average degree is 1/n
∑
di = 1/20 · 8 · 7 = 2.8, see Fig. 18) of
the agents that were part of a permanent set in the initial graph
37
(the stability riterion whih
denes an equilibrium network is given in (24)).
37
the reation of the initial random graph with a given link reation probability has been hosen rather small
suh that only a few nodes are permanent.
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Figure 18: Bilateral link formation: (a) Average value of knowledge. (b) Average degree. ()
Initial random graph (for reasons of visualization we have hosen a rather sparse random
graph). (d) Graph after 1000 iterations (in the equilibrium).
5.2.3 Utility Driven Dynamis: unilateral link formation
The mehanisms of unilateral reation and deletion of links has been introdued in setion (4.3).
In our simulations we observe the following observe the following eet. When we allow for
unilateral link formation, large yles get redued to a small set of 2-yles. In the equilibrium
network (the stability riterion whih denes an equilibrium network is given in (23)) most of the
agents are isolated nodes and thus have vanishing values of knowledge. Only a few of them are
organized in 2-yles and small subgraphs onsisting of multiple 2-yles. As we will show, the
reason for this is that as soon as there exists a shortut (a smaller yle) in a larger yle agents
try to free-ride and, after the other agents have realized that and sopped sharing their knowledge
with them, they get isolated and experiene vanishing values of knowledge. One an interpret
this result as follows: Even though agents ould in prinipal form indiret reiproal interations
the resulting equilibrium network onsists only of diret reiproal interations (2-yles and
lusters of 2-yles).
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Figure 19: Agent 3 forms a link to agent 1, e31, and thus a 2-yle is reated inside a 3-yle.
2
1
3
→
2
1
3
Figure 20: Deletion of the link e21. Agent 2 is not sharing any knowledge with others but only
reeiving knowledge from agent 3. Thus, agent 2 is freeriding.
We an give an example of the proess of the redution of yles in a graph G with 3 nodes for
parameter values d = 0.5, b = 1 and c ∈ (0, 1). By numerially omparing utilities (the xed
points of the value of knowledge) before and after a link is reated or deleted we show that there
exists a sequene of link deletions and reations whih transform a 3-yle into a 2-yle while
every link hange is assoiated with an inrease in the utility (the xed point in the value of
knowledge) of the initiating agent (Jakson (2003) alls this sequene of graphs an improving
path).
In Fig. (19) (left) agent 3 reates a link to agent 1 beause in this range of parameters this
inreases her value of knowledge. This an be seen in Fig. (19) (right), where the inrease ∆x3
dierent osts c ∈ (0, 1) are plotted and ∆u3 = limt→infty ∆x3 > 0.
In Fig. (20) (left) agent 2 removes her link to agent 1 and thus she stops ontributing knowledge
but instead is only reeiving knowledge from agent 3. We say that agent 2 is free-riding. This
inreases her utility, sine ∆u2 = limt→infty ∆x2 > 0, as an be seen in Fig. (20) (right) for
dierent osts c.
Finally, in Fig. (21) (left) agent 3 removes her link to agent 2 beause she is better o, as
illustrated in Fig. (21) (right), when she stops ontributing knowledge to an agent that is nothing
ontributing in return. This is atually true for agent 2. Agent 2 therefore gets isolated and
experienes a vanishing value of knowledge in the long-run, limt→∞ x2 = 0. Her utility is null.
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Figure 21: Deletion of the link e32 by agent 3. Agent 3 realizes that she is better o by not
sharing her knowledge with agent 2. Agent 2, that was free-riding before now gets isolated and
experienes a vanishing value of knowledge in the long run.
We end up in a setting where out of a ooperation of many (the sharing of knowledge) only a
small set of ooperators remains and all the remaining agents vanish, i.e. have vanishing values
of knowledge and utility. We an see this in a simulation starting from an initial random graph
with 30 agents and the resulting equilibrium network in Fig. (22) (bottom right).
Sine the performane of the system in terms of the total value of knowledge is very low, we
investigate in the next setion the onditions under whih the performane an be inreased
(with more agents being permanent in the equilibrium). We nd that the existene of a positive
network externality (explained in the next setion) an enhane the performane of the system.
5.3 Introduing Positive Network Externalities
In this setion we study the growth of the value of knowledge whih inludes an additional benet
term ontributing to an inrease in the value of knowledge. This additional benet depends on
the network struture itself. In the eonomi literature (Tirole, 1988; Mas-Colell et al., 1995),
positive network externalities arise when a good is more valuable to a user the more users adopt
the same good or ompatible goods. In our model we dene a network externality simply as a
funtion of the network struture that aets the utility of an agent. Inluding the externality in
the benet an yield more omplex strutures with non vanishing knowledge values as equilibrium
networks. The growth of the value of knowledge of agent i is given by the following equation:
dxi
dt
= −dxi + b
n∑
i=1
ajixj + be
n∑
i=1
wjixj︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive network externality
−c
n∑
i=1
aijx
2
i (82)
and the utility is again given by ui = limt→∞ xi(t). Link hanges are based on the inrease in
utility. The network benet inorporates the fat that the value of knowledge an hange with
the number of users of that knowledge, (82). But the number of users an either enhane or
diminish the value of knowledge that is being transferred between agents, depending on the type
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Figure 22: Unilateral link formation: (a) Average utility. (b) Average degree. () Initial ran-
dom graph. (d) Graph after 2000 iterations (in the equilibrium). For the parameter values
d = 0.5, b = 0.5, c = 0.1, used in this simulation, the omplete graph K3 is an equilibrium.
Note from setion (A) one an see that for parameter values d = 0.5, b = 1, c = 0.5 this is no
longer the ase and K3 would be redued to a 2-yle C2.
of knowledge under investigation. On one hand, the value an derease with the number of agents
that pass on that knowledge. Knowledge is attenuated with the distane from the reator to the
reeiver. We study this type of knowledge with a link weight dened in (82) and denoted by
wji. In the next setion we study the opposite eet: the value of knowledge inreases with the
number of users. This holds for example for general purpose tehnologies that get more valuable
the more they are applied and used in dierent ontexts (and users). The link weights used for
this type of knowledge in (82) are denoted by wnji , w
e
ji , where the rst measures the number of
agents using that knowledge and the seond the number of interations.
We introdue dierent link weights, denoted by wji, w
n
ji , w
e
ji . Moreover, agents are reating
and deleting links unilaterally (Utility Driven Dynamis). We then study the eet of dierent
weights on the equilibrium networks obtained.
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5.3.1 Centrality
The growth funtion of the value of agent i is given by
dxi
dt
= −dxi +
n∑
j=1
(baji + bew

ji)xj − c
n∑
j=1
aijx
2
i (83)
The utility is given by ui = limt→∞ xi(t) (large T ). Link hanges are aepted on the basis of
an inrease in utility. The entrality measure omputes the sum of the inverse lengths of all
the shortest paths ontaining the link for whih the entrality is omputed. If two agents are
not onneted then the length of the path is assumed to be innity and thus its weight is zero.
Instead, if two agents are diretly onneted via an link, then the weight is one. The weight values
links that brings agents loser to eah other higher. This is a similar approah to the Connetions
Model introdued in setion 2.2 with a utility given by (4). The entrality link weight, wij , is
then omputed as follows.
wij =
∑
v∈V
1
(djv + 1)
, wij ∈ [0, 1] (84)
djv is the shortest path between node j and node v. If there exists no path between two nodes,
then the distane between them is innity
38
.
In simulations, Fig. (23), we observe, that in the equilibrium network only a few agents have
non-vanishing utilities (the asymptoti knowledge values) and most of them are isolated nodes
with zero utilities. This result does not dier too muh from the studies in setion (5.2) where no
externality is onsidered. Apparently, if more agents should have non-vanishing utilities indued
by an additional benet depending on the network struture, this annot be realized with the
entrality link weight.
5.3.2 Ciruit-Centrality
The iruit-entrality measure puts a weight on the links that depends on the number of distint
nodes that are ontained in all the iruits going through the link under onsideration. The
motivation is that, if many agents are involved in the transfer of knowledge and this knowledge
then omes bak to the agent (thus reating a feedbak on the tehnology issued by the agent), it
gets an added value (e.g. for general purpose tehnologies (GPT) (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg,
1995; Karshenas and Stoneman, 1995; Cohen, 1995)) The more agents use a tehnology the more
it is improved and so the more agents are involved in suh a feedbak loop the higher is the value of
the tehnology. We an either ount the number of dierent agents involved in this feedbak loop
or the number of interations (links). Either possibility is explored in the next setions. This is an
38
We use a standard depth-rst-searh algorithm to ompute the shortest paths. More details on this algorithm
and further disussion is given in Steger and Shikinger (2001); Steger (2001); Ahuja et al. (1993); Cormen et al.
(2001)
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Figure 23: Centrality (5.3.1): (a) Average utility. (b) Average degree. () Initial random
graph. (d) Graph after 500 iterations (in the equilibrium).
alternative way to study the emergene of indiret reiproity where others Nowak and Sigmund
(2005) have studied it by introduing a (global) reputation mehanism.
We then dene the weight of an link wij as (i) the number mn of distint nodes that are in the
iruits from node i to j,
wnij =
mn
n
, wnij ∈ [0, 1] (85)
and (ii) the number me of distint links that are in the iruits from node i to j,
weij =
me
n(n− 1) , w
e
ij ∈ [0, 1] (86)
An example of the dierent link weights an be seen in Fig. (5.3.2).
In order to ompute all iruits in a direted graph G one needs to ompute the trails in G. The
losed trails then are the iruits in G. We use an algorithm to ompute all trails in G from a
given soure node s. An explanation of the algorithm is given in appendix (B).
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1
2
4
3
Figure 24: The link e12 is ontained in two iruits with nodes 1, 2, 4 and 1, 2, 3, 4. The num-
ber of distint nodes in these iruits is 4 and the number of distint links is 5. Aordingly
wnij =
4
4 = 1 and w
e
ij =
5
12 = 0.42.
By introduing the iruit-entrality externality, we will show that more agents are permanent in
the equilibrium network. The performane of the system is inreased ompared to the equilibrium
networks that emerge with unilateral link formation without this externality.
Using iruit-entrality measures the number of nodes (85) and the growth of the value of knowl-
edge is given by
dxi
dt
= −dxi +
n∑
j=1
(baji + bew
n
ji )xj − c
n∑
j=1
aijx
2
i (87)
The utility is given by ui = limt→∞ xi(t) (large T ). Link hanges are aepted on the basis of an
inrease in utility. Dierent to the entrality externality (5.3.1) we observe larger yles as the
equilibrium networks. This an be seen in the simulation run in Fig. (25) This positive externality
allows for more agents to be permanent in the equilibrium network than without an externality
or with the entrality-externality. We thus obtain a higher performane of the system.
Using the iruit-entrality measure with the number of links (86) the growth of the value of
knowledge is given by:
dxi
dt
= −dxi +
n∑
j=1
(baji + bew
e
ji )xj − c
n∑
j=1
aijx
2
i (88)
The utility is given by ui = limt→∞ xi(t) (large T ). Link hanges are aepted on the basis
of an inrease in utility. The iruit entrality with the number of links values the number
of interations instead the number of agents, that take part in the transfer of knowledge. We
still observe (g. 26) the emergene of iruits as equilibrium networks and a similar level of
performane (in terms of the total value of knowledge of the system). But now there are more
iruits (more links) in the subgraph ontaining the set of permanent agents. The equilibrium
network has a higher level of redundany (sine its has more iruits and links) and is therefore
more robust against the destrution of a single iruit (indued by a node or link failure).
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Figure 25: Ciruit number of nodes externality: (a) Average utility. (b) Average degree. ()
Initial random graph. (d) Graph after 500 iterations (in the equilibrium).
6 Disussion and Conlusion
6.1 Results From the Novel Modeling Approah
In the following we summarize the results found by studying our model of innovation dynamis, as
desribed in setions (3), (4) (5). Let us start by looking at the dynamis of the value of knowledge
in a stati network, in setion (3.5). If we assume that growth ours only through interation
among agents (thus negleting in-house R&D apabilities), then the network sustains itself only
through yles (more preisely through losed walks or strongly onneted omponents). Agents
survive and grow only if they are part of a yle (strongly onneted omponent) or if they
are onneted to suh a yle through an inoming path
39
. We have shown that an innovation
network whih is ayli will have vanishing knowledge values for all agents in the network.
However, if agents form yles they have permanent knowledge values.
Considering the evolution of the network we have studied two dierent settings, Extremal Dy-
namis and Utility Driven Dynamis. If the network evolves aording to a least t seletion
39
Jain and Krishna (2001) have denoted this set of nodes the autoatalyti set (ACS).
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Figure 26: Ciruit number of links externality: (a) Average utility. (b) Average degree. ()
Initial random graph. (d) Graph after 500 iterations (in the equilibrium).
mehanism (Extremal Dynamis) then we observe rashes and reoveries of the knowledge val-
ues of the agents and the network itself. Thus, an extremal market seletion mehanism whih
replaes the worst performing agent with a new agent annot generate equilibrium networks nor
does it sustain a high performane in the value of knowledge of the individual agents or the eon-
omy as a whole. Notie also that Extremal Dynamis means that agents are ompletely passive
and have no ontrol on whom they interat with.
In a more realisti setting (Utility Driven Dynamis), agents deide with whom they interat and
they do so in order to inrease their utility. In the ontext of innovation this orresponds to their
value of knowledge. The information proessing apabilities of agents may be limited, espeially
if there is a large number of agents in the eonomy. Thus, we allow agents to deide themselves
to reate or delete links on a trial and error basis. Those interations that prove to be beneial
are maintained while un-beneial ones are severed. We nd that, under these onditions, the
evolution of the network depends on the ost, cij , of an interation between the agents, the type
of link formation (unilateral versus bilateral) and the time horizon T after whih interations are
evaluated.
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In the ase of null ost, agents always form new links and thus the omplete graph is eventually
realized.
We have shown in setion (3.4) that the knowledge values of agents vanish if the underly-
ing network does not ontain a yle (similar to the results obtained by Rosenblatt (1957);
Maxeld (1994). The equilibrium networks are ontain yles similar to Bala and Goyal (2000);
Kim and Wong (2007)). However, the evolution of the network driven by the selsh linking pro-
ess of agents an lead to the destrution of theses vital yles. For a short time horizon T , and
unilateral link formation, yles get destroyed beause agents free-ride and delete their outgoing
links as it is beneial in the short run to save the osts of supporting other agents. As a result,
the whole innovation network is destroyed. On the other hand, if the time horizon is long enough,
agents do not delete the yles they are part of.
However, even when the time horizon is long, large yles get destroyed in favor of smaller ones
when agents unilaterally form or delete links. The network, starting from an initial state of high
density, evolves into an absorbing state in whih most of the nodes are isolated and few pairs of
nodes are onneted by bilateral links. These pairs are trivial yles of length k = 240.
Reall, that pairwise onnetions are diret reiproal interations. This means that, even though
agents are unilaterally forming links and therefore indiret reiproal interations would be pos-
sible in priniple (this is equivalent to interation taking plae on a yle of length k ≥ 3) no
relation of indiret reiproity is able to emerge nor to survive. From the point of view of the
global performane of the innovation network, this is a very unsatisfatory situation.
In setion (5.3) we have studied situations in whih even unilateral knowledge exhange an
have a higher performane in terms of the number of permanent agents and their total value of
knowledge. We introdue an externality in the knowledge growth funtion whih inreases the
value of knowledge of the agent depending on their position in the network. We study a type of
tehnology where the value of knowledge dereases with the number of agents transferring the
knowledge. Here unilateral knowledge exhange still leads to equilibrium networks with a low
performane and only a few permanent agents.
However, for a type of knowledge where its value inreases with the number of agents that
transfer and use it, more agents an be permanent in the equilibrium network and the system
performane is inreased. Moreover, if the number of interations instead of the number of users
determines the added value of the knowledge that is being transferred, then the equilibrium
has not only a higher performane than in the setting, where knowledge is attenuated with the
number of users or where no externalities are onsidered, but it is also more robust against node
or onnetion failures. We observe that, in our framework, indiret reiproity emerges if it is
assoiated with a positive externality, taking into aount the struture of the network.
40
This is dierent to the results obtained in Kim and Wong (2007) sine there the benet term in the utility of
the agents depends on the size of the onneted omponent but not on its struture.
67/84
Mihael D. König, Stefano Battiston, Frank Shweitzer: Modeling Evolving Innovation Networks
In: Innovation Networks - New Approahes in Modeling and Analyzing (Eds. A. Pyka, A. Sharnhorst)
Heidelberg: Springer, 2008
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
Cost Fun.
Netw. Evol.
Extremal Dynamis
Utility Driven Dynamis
Bilateral
Unilateral
without with
externality externality
cij = cx
2
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Kn
set of set of
breakdown C2 Ck≥2
Table 4: Overview of the equilibrium networks that are realized under dierent assumptions on
the network evolution and a quadrati ost funtion.
If agents form or delete links bidiretionally, that means, every exhange of knowledge is diret
reiproal, the network evolves into a omplete graph. This equilibrium network has a high per-
formane and all agents are permanent. In our study we nd that unilateral knowledge exhange
is always inferior to bilateral knowledge exhange. But the above disussion has shown that, when
bilateral knowledge exhange is not possible and agents are sharing their knowledge unilaterally,
innovation networks are still able to emerge.
The dierent ases studied in this setion have shown that the equilibrium innovation network
that is realized in the evolution of the system depends ritially on the assumptions made on the
behavior of agents (Extremal Dynamis versus Utility Driven Dynamis), on their time horizon
for evaluating their deisions and on the ost assoiated with the sharing of knowledge. These
results are summarized in table (4)
6.2 General Conlusions
In this hapter we studied a variety of dierent models for innovation networks. We started by
disussing the importane of networks in eonomis and emphasized that these networks are
intrinsially dynami and omposed of heterogeneous units. The notion of a omplex network
was used in the beginning to briey explain how statistial physis an be involved to study
them. We tried to lassify dierent approahes to modeling eonomi networks, in partiular we
onsidered the onnetion between the state variables assoiated with the nodes of a network,
e.g. the produtivity level of a rm, and the dynamis of the network itself, i.e. the interations
between rms.
Before developing our own modeling framework, we disussed some basi models of eonomi
networks with agents engaged in knowledge prodution. These models show that the eonomy
an evolve into equilibrium networks whih are not neessarily eient. Moreover, the equilibrium
networks that emerge in these models are rather simple. We briey introdued some models in
whih more ompliated network strutures emerge, whih may be loser to real-world innovation
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networks. We then disussed models in whih yles, i.e. losed feedbak loops, play an important
role in the network formation and the performane of the system (similar to Rosenblatt (1957)).
The major part of the hapter was devoted to the development of our own modeling framework
whih is based on atalyti knowledge interations. In this setting there are permanent agents
(with non-vanishing knowledge values) only if the underlying network ontains a yle. We inves-
tigated the evolution and performane of the system under dierent seletion mehanisms, i.e.,
a least t seletion mehanism, denoted by Extremal Dynamis, versus Utility Driven Dynamis
in whih agents deide upon their interation partners in a trial and error proedure. We ob-
serve that a least t mehanism annot generate stable networks nor sustain high performane in
knowledge prodution. Moreover suh a mehanism assumes that agents are ompletely passive
entities. In the ase of Utility Driven Dynamis, agents hoose their ations in order to inrease
their utility but their information proessing apabilities are limited. If agents are evaluating
their interations after a time long enough, we obtain equilibrium networks with non-vanishing
(permanent) knowledge prodution.
In our framework, we investigated dierent assumptions about the behavior of agents, that is, we
either assume that agents share knowledge bilaterally or unilaterally. If all interations are bilat-
eral, the equilibrium network is a omplete graph and it has the highest performane. However,
if diret reiproal interations annot be enfored (whih means that links are not neessarily
bilateral), we still observe the emergene of networks of knowledge sharing agents. But in the
equilibrium network only bilateral interations remain. Moreover, only a few agents are perma-
nent and the system has a low performane ompared to the ase of purely bilateral interations.
However, for unilateral interations, the number of permanent agents an be signiantly in-
reased, for a type of tehnology where the number of users inreases its value.
Our studies show that the range of innovation networks that an emerge in this general framework
is aeted by various parameters. Amongst these are information proessing apabilities of agents,
their time horizon, their interational behavior, the ost assoiated with the sharing of knowledge
and the type of tehnology whih agents produe and transfer.
The variety of possible networks is quite large and the network model appropriate for a given
appliation should be determined based on the speiities of the problem under investigation.
Appendix
A Stationary Solutions for G(n = 3)
Example 28 We ompute the xed points for all graphs (auto-morphisms) with n = 3 nodes
and initial values x(0) = ( 1
n
, 1
n
, 1
n
)T = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3)
T
. For the numerial integration we set d = 0.5,
c = 0.5 and b = 1. The xed points (stationary solutions are denoted x∗i for i = 1, 2, 3). Where
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possible, we give the analytial solutions for the positive xed points. x∗i = 0 is a xed point for
all graphs.
(1)
2
1
3
A1 =

 0 1 10 0 0
0 0 0


0 5 10 15 200
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
 
 
PSfrag replaements
x1
x2
x3
x
i
t
The xed points are given by
x∗i = 0 (89)
(2)
1
2
3
A2 =

 0 1 00 0 1
0 0 0


0 5 10 15 200
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
 
 
PSfrag replaements
x1
x2
x3
x
i
t
The xed points are given by
x∗i = 0 (90)
(3)
1
2
3
A3 =

 0 1 01 0 1
0 0 0

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0 5 10 15 200
0.5
1
1.5
 
 
PSfrag replaements
x1
x2
x3
x
i
t
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(4)
1
3
2
A4 =

 0 0 10 0 1
0 0 0

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0 5 10 15 200
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
 
 
PSfrag replaements
x1
x2
x3
x
i
t
The xed points are given by
x∗i = 0 (91)
(5)
2
1
3
A5 =

 0 0 11 0 1
0 0 0

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0 5 10 15 200
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
 
 
PSfrag replaements
x1
x2
x3
x
i
t
The xed points are given by
x∗i = 0 (92)
(6)
2
1
3
A6 =

 0 1 11 0 1
0 0 0

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0 5 10 15 200
0.5
1
1.5
2
 
 
PSfrag replaements
x1
x2
x3
x
i
t
The xed points are given by
x∗1 = x
∗
2 =
b− d
2c
(93)
x∗3 =
b(b− d)
cd
(94)
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(7)
1
2
3
A7 =

 0 1 01 0 0
0 1 0


0 5 10 15 200
0.5
1
1.5
 
 
PSfrag replaements
x1
x2
x3
x
i
t
The xed points are given by
x∗1 = x
∗
2 =
b− d
c
(95)
x∗3 = 0 (96)
(8)
1
3
2
A8 =

 0 0 10 0 1
1 1 0

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0 5 10 15 200
0.5
1
1.5
 
 
PSfrag replaements
x1
x2
x3
x
i
t
x∗1 = x
∗
2 are the roots of the polynomial
x3 +
2d
c
x2 +
d(b+ 2d)
2c2
x+
b(d2 − 2b2)
2c3
= 0
and x∗3 =
d
b
x+ c
b
x2.
(9)
2
1
3
A9 =

 0 1 00 0 1
1 0 0

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0 5 10 15 200.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
 
PSfrag replaements
x1
x2
x3
x
i
t
The xed points are given by
x∗1 = x
∗
2 = x
∗
3 =
b− d
c
(97)
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(10)
2
1
3
A10 =

 0 0 11 0 1
0 1 0

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0 5 10 15 200
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1
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PSfrag repla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x1
x2
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x
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(11)
2
1
3
A11 =

 0 1 10 0 1
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
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0 5 10 15 200
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1
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PSfrag repla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x
i
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The xed points are given by
x∗2 = x
∗
3 =
b− d
c
(98)
x∗1 = 0 (99)
(12)
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3
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
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(13)
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3
A13 =

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1
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t
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The xed points are given by
x∗1 = x
∗
2 = x
∗
3 =
2b− d
2c
(100)
(14)
3
2
1
A14 =

 0 0 00 0 0
0 1 0

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x
i
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The xed points are given by
x∗i = 0 (101)
(15)
3
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1
A15 =

 0 0 00 0 0
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ements
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The xed points are given by
x∗i = 0 (102)
(16)
2
1
3
A16 =

 0 1 01 0 0
0 0 0

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0 5 10 15 200
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0.4
0.6
0.8
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PSfrag replaements
x1
x2
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x
i
t
The xed points are given by
x∗3 = 0 (103)
x∗1 = x
∗
2 =
b− d
c
(104)
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B All-Trails-Single-Soure Algorithm
In this setion we introdue an algorithm ALL-TRAILS-SINGLE-SOURCE that omputes all
trails from a given node s ∈ V to all other nodes in a direted graph G = (V,E). From these
trails we an extrat the trails whih end in node s and thus form iruits. In the following we
will give a short desription of the algorithm.
Algorithm 1 ALL-TRAILS-SINGLE-SOURCE
S ← newStack();
v ← s;
W ← {}; {initialization of empty list of trails}
loop
if ∃u ∈ N+(v)\{s} s.t. the link evu annot be appended to W to reate a new trail then
S.push(v);
W [u].addEdge((v, u));
v ← u;
else if S.isEmpty() == false then
v ← s.pop();
else
break;
end if
end loop
return W ;
Similar to a depth-rst-searh algorithm, links are explored out of the most reent disovered node
v that still has unexplored links leaving it. This proedure of exploring links an be represented
by a searh tree T . The tree T explored by the algorithm ontains all trails starting at the soure
s to every node in G.
At every node i a list W [i] of trails leading from the soure s to i is assigned. When the next
link eij from i to j is proessed, to all trails in W [i] the link eij is appended (if this is possible,
meaning that no link repetition is allowed), denoted by W [i] + eij . At node j these trails are
added, that is W ′[j] = W [j] ∪ {W [i] + eij}. This proedure is ontinued until the algorithm
terminates. The algorithm terminates, if the are no further links available for exploration. The
progress of the algorithm on a direted graph with 4 nodes and 2 iruits ontaining the nodes
(2, 3, 4, 1) and (2, 4, 1), respetively, is shown in Fig. (27).
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step 1
1
W [1] = {}
2
W [2] = {}
3
W [3] = {}
4
W [4] = {}
step 2
1
W [1] = {}
2
W [2] = {}
3
W [3] = {(e23)}
4
W [4] = {}
step 3
1
W [1] = {}
2
W [2] = {}
3
W [3] = {(e23)}
4
W [4] = {(e23, e34)}
step 4
1
W [1] = {(e23, e34, e41)}
2W [2] = {}
3
W [3] = {(e23)}
4
W [4] = {(e23, e34)}
step 5
1
W [1] = {(e23, e34, e41)}
2W [2] =
{(e23, e34, e41, e12)}
3
W [3] = {(e23)}
4
W [4] = {(e2,3, e3,4)}
step 6
1
W [1] = {(e23, e34, e41)}
2
W [2] =
{(e23, e34, e41, e12)}
3
W [3] = {(e23)}
4
W [4] = {(e24), (e23, e34),
(e23, e34, e41, e12, e24)}
Figure 27: The progress of the algorithm ALL-TRAILS-SINGLE-SOURCE on a direted graph
with node 2 as the soure node. The node indiated in red is visited in the sueeding steps.
After step 6 no further trails are added to the list of trails.
C Simulation Parameters
The parameters shown in table (5) have been used for the simulation runs presented in setion
(5).
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Desription Variable Value
initial link reation probability p 0.1
initial value of knowledge x(0) 1.0
number of agents (without externality) n 30
number of agents (with externality) n 20
max. numerial integration time (time horizon) T 100
numerial integration time step ∆t 0.05
max. number of network updates N [100, 5000]
benet b 0.5
deay d 0.5
ost c 0.1
Table 5: Simulation parameters.
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